University of Wisconsin Milwaukee

UWM Digital Commons
Theses and Dissertations
8-1-2013

The Effect of Urban Fortification on Public Space
Ryan Lee Anderson
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.uwm.edu/etd
Part of the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation
Anderson, Ryan Lee, "The Effect of Urban Fortification on Public Space" (2013). Theses and Dissertations.
655.
https://dc.uwm.edu/etd/655

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by UWM Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UWM Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact open-access@uwm.edu.

THE EFFECT OF URBAN FORTIFICATION ON PUBLIC SPACE

by

Ryan Anderson

A Dissertation Submitted in
Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in Urban Studies
at
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
August 2013

ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF URBAN FORTIFICATION ON PUBLIC SPACE
by
Ryan Anderson

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013
Under the Supervision of Professor Donald Green
This dissertation contributes to empirical studies on the spatial extent and intensity of
urban fortification/security zones and their influence on urban public space. Urban
public space has been based on creating open and safe environments for city dwellers.
However, ultra-secure urban spaces have been found to filter citizens, restrict movement,
and modify individual behavior. This first part of this study determines where security
zones manifest themselves, quantify the fortification of the security zones, and measure
the intensity of these spaces in three major U.S. cities. The second part of the study
offers an explanation of how social and commercial activity is being affected by security
zones.
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The Effect of Urban Fortification on Public Space
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of April 19th, 1995, Timothy McVeigh awoke in a rental truck
parked near a roadside motel in northern Oklahoma. As he drove into downtown
Oklahoma City, he placed earplugs in his ears and continued to drive. He stopped briefly
to light the first of two fuses connected to the bomb. Soon after, he lit the second fuse
while stopped at a red light.
McVeigh parked the Ryder rental truck near the delivery dock in front of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. He exited the truck and locked all the doors of the
vehicle, then casually walked away from the building. The people inside of the Murrah
Federal Building and within the surrounding area, were unaware of what was about to
unfold that Wednesday morning. At 9:02 AM the bomb detonated with the explosion
obliterating the front half of the Murrah Federal Building. McVeigh would later recall
that he was lifted an inch off the ground by the blast. Soon after the blast McVeigh was
in his car heading out of the city.
The Murrah Federal Building housed numerous federal agencies including the
Drug Enforcement Agency, United States Secret Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms, General Services Administration, Department of the Army, Department of
Defense, Federal Highway Administration, Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Labor Department, and the Veterans Administration. The explosion
disrupted governmental services and destroyed the lives of clerks, secretaries, federal law
enforcement officers, citizens, and children.
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According to the Oklahoma City Department of Civil Emergency Management
After Action Report (1996), when the bomb detonated, approximately 600 employees
and 250 visitors were in the building. The blast and resulting collateral damage at the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building killed 168 people and injured over 800 other people.
The force of the bomb leveled the north face of the building, and caused extensive
damage to all nine floors of the building. After the dust settled, the building lay in ruins.
The explosion also crippled downtown Oklahoma City.
The concussion of the blast damaged over 300 surrounding buildings, overturned
automobiles, shattered windows, started fires, and blew out doors in a 50 block radius.
More than 400 individuals were left homeless in the surrounding area. Approximately
7,000 people lost their workplace. It was reported that the blast was felt 55 miles from
the blast site and registered a 6.0 on the Richter scale. Not only did the terrorist attack
cause considerable physical devastation and death, the attack also caused a significant
amount of psychological and emotional toll on the estimated 16,000 people in the
downtown area at the time of the explosion. The Oklahoma City bombing marked the
beginning of a national approach to security planning and building design to combat
terrorist acts.
Soon after the Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City, the U.S.
General Services Administration was tasked with providing guidelines to secure areas in
and around federal buildings and courthouses (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005). The
agency embarked on a nationwide effort to secure its nearly 1,800 federal buildings,
courthouses, and other government stations. After the inventory, public buildings began
to close streets, place concrete barriers in plazas, and install numerous security devices to
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provide a much more secure public building. Other recommendations by General
Services Administration included: landscape design elements; site planning and access;
vehicle circulation; standoff distance; hardening of building exteriors; window glazing to
reduce flying debris; and engineering design to prevent progressive collapse (Nadel,
2004). However, the Oklahoma City Bombing was not the last terrorist attack
experienced on U.S. soil.
On September 11, 2001 at 7:59 AM, American Airlines Flight 11 took off from
Boston’s Logan Airport bound for Los Angeles. Everything about the flight was routine
until 8:14 AM, when American 11 had its last routine communication with Boston’s air
traffic control center. Shortly after that Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, stabbed two
flight attendants in the first class section of the plane (National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States, 2004). It is speculated the Shehri brothers were able to
gain access to the cockpit after stabbing the two flight attendants and slashing the throat
of another passenger.
Shortly after this incident, Mohamed Atta, the only terrorist trained to fly an
airplane, moved to the cockpit from his business class seat. After Atta was seated at the
controls, the remaining hijackers sprayed pepper spray, or some other type of irritant, in
the first class section, forcing all the passengers to the rear of the plane. Five minutes
from the hijacking, flight attendants, Betty Ong and Amy Sweeny, contacted an
American Airlines Services Office and relayed information about the events taking place.
At 8:26 AM, Ong reported that the plane was flying erratically. One minute later,
American 11 turned south for New York. Ong and Sweeny continued to relay seat
numbers and descriptions of the hijackers to American Airlines Control Center personnel.
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At 8:41 AM, Sweeney reported the plane was in rapid decent. At this time air traffic
controllers declared American 11 hijacked and began rerouting air traffic so American 11
could land at John F. Kennedy International Airport. At 8:43 AM, Mohamed Atta made
his final turn towards Manhattan. At 8:44 AM, Sweeney frantically reported to the
American Airlines Control Center, “Oh my God we are way too low!” Seconds later the
phone call ended. At 8:46 AM, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World
Trade Center.
The aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks left 2,996 people dead with
over 6,000 more injured. World Trade Center’s 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Fitterman Hall,
Deutsche Bank Building, and St. Nicholas Greek Orthodox Church were all destroyed
with dozens of other buildings damaged in the attack (FEMA, 2002). However, the
crumbling of the twin towers will forever be engrained into the minds of U.S. citizens.
Preventing another terrorist attack became top priority of the U.S. government (Heyman
and Ridge, 2006).
The Patriot Act was the first major piece of legislation passed in response to the
September 11th attacks. In the year after the attacks, Congress passed more than 130
pieces of legislation related to combating terrorism. Such legislation included the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act. The government also created the Department of Homeland Security,
which is the third largest agency in the U.S. government. More than 260 government
agencies were either created or reorganized following the terrorist attacks (Priest and
Arkin, 2010). More than 1,200 government organizations and 1,900 private companies
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engage in work related to counter-terrorism, homeland security, and intelligence (Priest
and Arkin, 2010). Budgets for anti-terrorism and defense related matters also rose.
Often in times of emergency or disaster, governments utilize architecture to
reassert their power and authority (Dovey, 2001).

After the September 11th terrorist

attacks, New York’s Lower Manhattan was encased in Jersey barriers and chain link
fencing (Sorkin, 2008). Throughout the country, makeshift security improvements were
designed with the sole purpose of improving the safety of the building and its occupants,
with little to no regard for social, economic, transportation, or aesthetic consideration.
The open areas surrounding these buildings have been scenes for farmers markets,
outdoor concerts, and picnics. With the implementation of these new security measures
these public uses have nearly been eliminated. These new spaces often resemble sterile
fortress like spaces and are known as security zones (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).
Such terrorist attacks add further momentum to an already apparent militarization
and fortification of urban public space in many U.S. cites (Coaffee, 2009). In the U.S.,
terrorism has been portrayed as a threat to freedom, democracy, and civilization; only
countered by a need to fortify cities coupled by military action across the globe (Coaffee,
2009, Marcuse, 2006, Graham, 2007). Graham (2007) states the systemic fortification of
our cities is closely related to continuing social polarization, urban sprawl, continued
expansion of fortified enclaves, and a growing culture of fear.
Exploiting the culture of fear are security industries and experts who profit from
providing municipalities and businesses services in communications, sensing, tracking,
and surveillance systems. Shortly after September 11th, Mike Davis predicted that
military and security companies of the new “fear economy” would quickly capitalize on
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the nation’s nervousness of future terrorist attacks in urban areas (Davis, 2001). Marcuse
(2006) notes, with the threat of terrorism, the security industry is now one of the fastest
growing sectors of the U.S. economy. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing, Washington
D.C. has become the epicenter of a type of security industrial complex (Hoffman and
Chalk, 2002).
Defensive urban design can minimize the damage of a terrorist strike on key
urban spaces (FEMA, 2011). For example, bollards can be erected around building
perimeters to increase standoff distance between a truck bomb and the building, thereby
reducing the potential damage to the building. However, any secured boundary will
always remain semi-accessible to any determined terrorist. These security zones also
interfere with the fundamental accessibility of contemporary cities.
Cities are based on the freedom of movement and interaction relies and depends
on intricate and open flows of people, goods, commodities, information, and capital
(Coaffee, 2009). Graham (2007) worries that current government policies towards urban
anti-terrorism could potentially reduce the cities “porous, open, intrinsically
unpredictable city spaces and systems” to nothing more than an endless series of secured
passage points. For city dwellers, urban anonymity would be lost and urban life would
be intolerable and unsustainable. As Graham (2007) states:

7

With the pervasive mantra of security creeping over every
domain of public life and public policy – which previously
were dominated by other concerns such as urban design,
social, welfare, immigration policy, transportation
management, and city planning – there is a real risk that
with the excuse of stopping terrorists before they strike, the
very processes of interchange, interconnection, privacy,
political mobilization, and social and democratic
innovation that make cities livable, dynamic, creative and
successful, might be seriously undermined (¶ 15).
Statement of Purpose
It is not a matter of if another terrorist attack will occur, but when. These attacks
can occur in any major city or small town U.S.A. What is known, is the fundamental
counter measure to prevent such attacks is urban fortification; and the fortification itself
does have a measurable influence on urban public space (Coaffee, 2009; Graham, 2010;
Hollander and Whitfield, 2005; Marcuse, 2006; Savitch, 2008; and Warren, 2002). The
measurable influence on urban public space is a combination of
militarization/fortification/deployment of security zones, the decline of iconography, and
decentralization (Briggs, 2005).
Few researchers have examined what security methods are present within the
urban areas. While studies have described the existence of anti-terror security that is
present in global cities like New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009),
Washington D.C. (Benton-Short, 2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008), none have
conducted empirical assessments of the spatial extent of security zones. Studies that have
identified the existence of security zones (Hollander and Whitfield, 2010) have only
provided recommendations for a balance between open public spaces and their security.
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However, these studies did not provide approximations or the degree and intensity of
security zones.
Given the amount of research dedicated to the aesthetics and perception in urban
security studies, the lack of studies on security zones in urban public space is an
oversight. The majority of urban security research has been focused on the symbolic
meaning of the security measures (Blobaum and Hunecke, 2005; Day 2006; Wang and
Taylor, 2006). This dissertation contributes to empirical studies on the spatial extent and
intensity of urban fortification/security zones and their influence on urban public space.
This study determines where security zones manifest themselves by quantifying
the fortification of the security zones and measure the intensity of these spaces in three
major U.S. cities. Once the intensity and extent of the security zones have been
identified, this dissertation will show how the increased security affects demographic,
economic, and social activity within the central business districts of Chicago,
Indianapolis, and Detroit. By studying cities such as Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit,
this analysis will determine whether cities that have not experienced a major terrorist
attack and have a smaller population and density, have fortified buildings, areas, and
neighborhoods and also restrict or close off public space in their civic and financial
districts, similar to larger global cities such as New York, London, and Madrid.
The fortification of urban space dissolves many settings in which protests,
demonstrations, and various other First Amendment rights can be freely utilized. Urban
public space has been based on creating open and safe environments for city dwellers.
However, ultra-secure urban spaces can filter citizens into oppositional groups limiting
access to those believed appropriate (Nemeth, 2009). Newman (1973) found that
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constant surveillance in a public space made pedestrians feel as if they were hostile
foreigners who should not be present. Security zones may function well in securing
property and the safety of urban dwellers, but if social and commercial activities are
being affected by security zones, empirical studies are needed to better understand the
frequency and intensity of security zones manifesting themselves within public space.
Methodology
To better understand the emerging phenomena of security zones and fortifying
urban public space, this dissertation will examine security zones located in the civic and
financial business districts in three U.S. cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis. Major
global cities such as London and New York, having all experienced terrorist attacks, are
recognized as the standard of interagency collaboration and proactive planning against
terrorist attacks (Ervin, 2008). However, there is virtually nothing written about recent
security measures or changing urban space in Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis in
response to security zones.
Each city in this study is listed in the Department of Homeland Security’s 2010
Urban Area Security Initiative List. The United States Department of Homeland Security
has identified these cities as high risk targets for future terrorist strikes, and these cities
receive federal funding in response to this threat. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) devotes 34 percent of its operating budget to making potential terrorist targets less
vulnerable to attack (Hobijn and Sager, 2007). The DHS considers Chicago to be a Tier I
urban area due to its high population density and high risk for threats (DHS, 2010). An
analysis of this type of city is likely to expose fortification measures at their most
extreme. Detroit and Indianapolis are considered Tier II cities due to their lack of
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potential terrorist targets. These cities were selected in order to determine the level and
intensity of security differences between Tier I and II type cities, as well as to compare
the differences in social and commercial activities between Tier I and Tier II cities.
It is also informative to analyze central businesses districts in cities other than
New York, London, and other major global cities, to better understand whether security
measures differ in relation to the size and population density of cities. Therefore, this
dissertation will examine security zones/fortified spaces within both civic center districts,
which are comprised mainly of public buildings and governmental structures, and
financial business districts which encompass major banks and other financial institutions.
For the three sample cities, these areas are located within their central business districts.
The concentration of high-profile corporate headquarters and governmental buildings
make these areas prime targets for high profile terrorist attacks (Savitch, 2008).
The districts studied within each city differ in population, density, size, and
geographic location. Each city offers a very different expression of public space. This
study considers public space to be: publicly or privately owned exterior space legally
required to allow public access, including all plazas, parks, sidewalks, and pedestrian
streets where motorized traffic is forbidden. Privately owned spaces, such as corporate
plazas, are still publicly accessible, but might present different obstacles or prioritize use
for employees over the general public.
A security zone is a restricted area located around a public or private building that
has a combination of access restrictions, behavioral controls, or other security measures
(Nemeth and Hollander, 2010). These individual zones embody a security landscape and
can be located on either public or private property and enforced and managed by private
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developers and property managers or governmental entities. An individual entering a
security zone will either be surveilled, have their behavior modified, or have their access
restricted to some degree, or experience a combination of these measures, while
occupying security zone space. The main attribute of a security zone is that it originates
as an aftereffect of terrorism prevention (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).
Because the levels of security zone restrictions vary from zone to zone, a simple
and objective set of criteria is used to distinguish and classify security zones and security
landscapes based on their overall level of restriction and or the presence and intensity of
certain benchmarks.

Figure 1: Jersey Barriers
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Figure 2: Bollards surrounding the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
These benchmark variables will be access restrictions, behavioral controls, and
surveillance. Access restrictions will include: bollards, Jersey barriers, gates, or fences
located at entrance and exit points to a space or building. Behavioral controls include
posted signs prohibiting activities such as photography or loitering, or physical features
that discourage sitting or gathering in small or large groups. Surveillance measures will
include security guards/police officers and other human surveillance. Closed circuit
television (CCTV) video surveillance cameras are also included under surveillance.
Drawing from Robert Sampson’s ecometric method of observing behavioral
settings, Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit were visited over a period of several days to
collect cross-sectional systematic social observations of existing security zones. Each
city’s security zone variables were observed then coded for analysis. The dimensions of
each security zone were also geotagged to ascertain and document the intensity of each
individual security zone. While in the field, a global positioning system (GPS) digital
camera was employed to define the boundaries of the security zones. Identifiable
security zones were photographed with the GPS camera which embeds global positional
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data, latitude and longitude, into the digital picture. This process is called geotagging
photos. The geotagged photographs were then uploaded into the geographic information
system (GIS) computing software program ArcGIS. The geotagged photos, with the
global positioning data, were then encoded to ArcGIS. The geotagged photographs allow
for the creation of security zone polygons by using the spatial calculation of the total area
of each security zone polygon. High resolution photographs of each security zone were
also collected. Buildings exhibiting the security zone classification criteria were
observed and coded for spatial analysis in ArcGIS.
Once the security zones were identified within the ArcGIS program a spatial
analysis of the data was conducted. The spatial analysis tool of inverse distance weighted
(IDW) interpolation, contained within the ArcGIS program, measured for the intensity of
the security zones and its neighboring space. IDW interpolation predicts a value for any
unmeasured data point using values from measured data points. This method is used to
measure the values of a particular phenomenon that cannot be measured at every data
point. Interpolation is commonly used for measuring precipitation, temperature, soil and
ground water characteristics, pollution sources, and various vegetation data.
This dissertation is the first time IDW interpolation will be employed to measure
the social phenomena of security zones. IDW interpolation will provide an observable
frequency and intensity of a security surface for security zones/defensible space measures
deployed to protect high value terrorist targets within each city’s core. ArcScene, a 3D
visualization software program that allows for GIS data to be viewed in three dimensions,
will be used to provide highly detailed security zone surfaces of the IDW interpolation
maps. This methodology can be replicated and will allow for future researchers to
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engage in cross-sectional or longitudinal analysis of Chicago, Indianapolis, Detroit or
other cities.
As previously stated, this dissertation will compare demographic, economic, and
social activity in the three cities, both within the identified security zones and areas
outside of the identified security zones. The data used for this study will be population
rates, crime rates, and office space rental rates from 2000 through 2010. In doing so, this
dissertation will provide a visual representation of security zones in these cities, as well
as offer an explanation of its influences over commercial and social activities within
these security zones.
Chapter two provides a theoretical foundation for this dissertation. Chapter three
begins with a review of the scholarly literature on the history on fortifying public and
private space within cities. The chapter explains the application and evolution of
combating terrorist activities with crime prevention through environmental design. A
detailed description of how security zones, located in the civic and financial business
districts in three U.S. cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis, will be analyzed and the
methodology that will be used to provide such analysis will be discussed in chapter four.
The findings and discussion are located in chapter five. Chapter six contains the
conclusion and recommendations section, which provides suggestions for future studies.
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CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL CONTEXT
Social Disorganization Theory
Although the concept of community is fundamental to society in general,
sociological definitions of community began with Par and Burges and the Chicago
School of Urban Sociology. Park and Burgess (1924) defined community as an area
developing from the competition over property, real estate, and other resources in an
urbanized city. Since this definition, a neighborhood has been considered as a
geographical and social subset of a community in which residents share a common sense
of identity that continues over a period of time (Burskik and Grasmick, 1993). Because
of this, empirical studies have approximated neighborhoods by geographical and political
boundaries such as census tracts, block groups, and various physical features.
Based upon Park and Burgess’ (1924) theory of urban ecology, Shaw and McKay
(1942) conducted a study of the spatial distribution of juvenile delinquency in Chicago
during the 1920s, which led them to propose social disorganization theory. Their study
provided an explanation for the unequal distribution of criminal activity in urban spaces.
They found by mapping out residential locations of juvenile delinquency over time that
crime rates are highest in lower-class neighborhoods, with a concentration within the
urban core. The crime rates decreased the further a juvenile was from the city center.
Shaw and McKay also found that crime rates in areas of the city remain stable over time,
regardless of social makeup. Therefore, juvenile delinquency was profoundly
concentrated in inner city neighborhoods over time, despite an almost total change in the
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racial and ethnic makeup of residents. This suggested that the setting was in some way
responsible for the crime rates.
Shaw and McKay (1942) also found that neighborhoods in the inner city were
characterized by numerous social problems. The inner city neighborhoods were
economically disadvantaged as indicated by the high number of people receiving public
assistance. Also, a high proportion of the people had low median rent, a low rate of
housing ownership, and high unemployment rates. Housing conditions were poor and the
jobs available to residents were mainly low skilled industrial jobs. Shaw and McKay also
found the high crime neighborhoods were characterized by high residential turnover
rates. They found several health problems within these neighborhoods such as infant
mortality, tuberculosis, and mental disorder. Finally, high crime neighborhoods were
characterized by racial diversity. Shaw and McKay believed the mixture of ethnic groups
hindered the collective efficacy among neighborhood residents. With these findings,
Shaw and McKay argued the spatial distribution of juvenile delinquency was a function
of ecological characteristics, and not the individual characteristics of neighborhood
residents. Their model suggested that neighborhood structural characteristics, such as
poverty and residential mobility, led to the social disorganization of the neighborhood,
which resulted in an increase in crime rates.
Shaw and McKay’s empirical analysis and theoretical outline were paramount in
supporting future studies of crime; however, several limitations of their work have been
identified (Bursik, 1988; Kurban and Weitzer, 2003; Sampson and Groves, 1989). The
most glaring problem with Shaw and McKay’s theory is it did not explain the causal
mechanism that links neighborhood social disorganization to high crime rates. Most
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notably, two versions of social disorganization theory can be perceived from Shaw and
McKay’s model (Kornhauser, 1978). The first is a variation of social disorganization
theory that links structural characteristics and crime through the frustrated wants of
residents in disadvantaged communities. Frustrated wants are the outcome of disparities
between aspirations and expectations. The strain variation of social disorganization
theory hypothesizes that criminal motivation and frustrated wants, resulting from the
structural characteristics of the neighborhood, is the intervening variable leading to an
increase in the crime rate.
The second version of social disorganization theory links structural characteristics
and crime through weakened informal social controls. Informal social control in socially
disorganized neighborhoods can be diminished in several ways. Due to high residential
mobility and racial diversity, inhabitants of disorganized neighborhoods do not create or
maintain an agreement of norms and values. A sense of attachment to the community,
social solidarity, and social cohesion are all diminished. Residents who plan to leave
their communities as soon as they have the means have little or no interest in fixing
neighborhood issues. With no common goals, neighborhood residents cannot implement
social controls and crime rates increase. Vacant buildings, graffiti, broken windows, and
vagrants become symbols that the neighborhood is in disarray.
Shaw and McKay (1942) also observed that inhabitants of disorganized
neighborhoods have fewer incentives in conformity, which lowers social controls or
deterrents against criminal activity. Juveniles living in disorganized neighborhoods
cannot develop conformity due to a conflicting value system. Having been exposed to
delinquent subcultures, the juveniles start to have low internal control and cultivate
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beliefs that are not consistent with conventional norms and values. Additionally,
traditional social institutions, such as family and schools, began to deteriorate which only
contributes to the lack of conformity and decreased social controls.
The control model of social disorganization theory contends that social control,
which is shaped internally and externally, impacts the costs of criminal activity.
Neighborhoods with high levels of social control make it difficult for individuals to
commit crime. Likewise, a neighborhood with decreased informal social controls, have
diminished stakes in conformity and weakens deterrents for criminal acts. Kornhauser
(1978) compared both versions of social disorganization theory and argues that the
control version is consistent with empirical evidence rather than the strain version.
Researchers have expanded upon the control version of social disorganization
theory by using survey data to identify the role of social ties and networks among
neighborhood inhabitants in establishing informal social control measures (Bursik and
Grasmik, 1993; Lowenkamp, Cullen, and Pratt, 2003; Sampson, 1991; Sampson and
Groves, 1989). In particular, Sampson and Groves (1989) presented that the effects of
structural characteristics on the level of crime were facilitated by the degree of
participation in community activities and extent of friendship networks, and the presence
of unsupervised youths. They argued that the structural characteristics of a
neighborhood, such as poverty, mobility, and racial composition, can decrease social ties
among residents, lower participation in community establishments, and the informal
monitoring of juveniles, which results in an increase in the level of criminal activity.
Bursik and Grasmick (1993) argued that social control in neighborhoods is
founded by social and physical institutions like family, schools, churches, and political
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groups. More specifically, they reasoned the level of social organization and control
varies across neighborhoods. This largely depends on the scope of internal social
cohesion among residents, as well as the extent of community leaders ties to outside
resources. Bursik and Grasmick’s version of social disorganization theory is referred to
as a systemic model that stresses the importance of networks among community
members. Their model suggests that structural characteristics, such as socioeconomic
status, diversity, and instability, affect the creation of these networks, which affects
various types of social controls.
However, Sampson (2004) disagreed with Bursik and Grasmick’s version and
claimed that strong social networks do not automatically result in effective social
controls. Sampson argues that collective efficacy, the mutual trust among residents and
the willingness to intervene when problems are present, is the key structural characteristic
that links social ties and the level of social control (Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush,
2001; Sampson, 2004; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997). Using a multilevel
framework, Sampson and his associates show that collective efficacy can be reliably
measured at the neighborhood level. Using 1990 census data with a survey of Chicago
residents, Sampson and his team found that the spatial proximity to homicide is strongly
related to increased homicide rates. Collective efficacy with concentrated disadvantage,
immigrant concentration, and community instability was able to explain approximately
70 percent of the variability in neighborhood violence. They also found that collective
efficacy was able to mediate a substantial amount of neighborhood violence through the
levels of socioeconomic disadvantage and residential instability.

20

Social disorganization theory offers a theoretical framework to understand the
relations between neighborhood structural characteristics and criminal activity. The
strain version of the theory argues that the principle variable that links neighborhood
characteristics and crime is produced by neighborhood disadvantage which increases
criminal motivation. The distribution of crime over space is a result of the degree in the
distribution of motivated offenders. However, the control version of the social
disorganization theory links the structural characteristics of neighborhoods to the level of
crime through informal social control measures. Social networks amongst residents,
interests in community issues, and a shared value system strengthen informal social
control. The control version of the theory explains the spatial distribution of crime by
fluctuating levels of social control that neighborhoods employ.
Routine Activities
In addition to social disorganization theory, routine activities theory has been
utilized to explain criminal activity over space, particularly at the micro level. Routine
activities theory views criminal events as the meeting of offenders and victims happening
under a certain set of circumstances. Routine activities theory holds that a crime occurs
when a motivated offender and a suitable target converge in time and space in the
absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979). The theory states that the
amount of crime can change even without an increase or decrease in the amount of
motivated offenders. Instead the number of crimes can increase or decrease as the
availability of suitable targets increases or decreases. Decreasing the amount of capable
guardians increases criminal opportunity, which leads to an increase in criminal activity.
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It must be noted that routine activities theory does not explain the factors of
criminal motivation. The theory treats criminal motivation as a truth and instead focuses
on the contexts and situations in which crime is most likely to happen. When explaining
criminal events, routine activities theory assumes that individuals have rational choices.
Criminal behavior is then predicted on the costs and benefits involved in the commission
of a criminal act. The costs and benefits vary depending on the situations and targets.
Routine activities theory considers opportunity a necessary component for a crime to
occur. The theory holds that crimes are not randomly distributed over space and time
because opportunity in not consistently distributed over space and time.
Under this theoretical framework, places and social contexts can facilitate or
reduce crime in several ways. The first, is that physical features of a space can affect the
degree of social control and criminal opportunities (Clarke, 2002; McNulty and
Holloway, 2000; Sampson, 2002). High rise buildings can reduce natural surveillance
because residents are living vertically and are uninvolved from monitoring activities at
the street level. Secondly, Residents may also not know each other because of high
residential turnover, which offers anonymity for potential offenders. Regardless of
physical features, the crime rates are also affected by routine activities that are present
(Block and Block, 1995; Davis, 1987; Eck 1995; Roncek and Maier, 1991). In particular,
vacant buildings and rundown housing units may provide a potential market for drug
dealers without fear of complaints from residents.
In addition to a micro level explanation for criminal activity, routine activities
theory also provides a framework for understanding crime at the macro level. Cohen and
Felson (1979) originally applied their theory to explain crime rates at the collective level.
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Their departure from the aggregate level was a contradiction between improving social
conditions and the increasing crime rates in the 1960s (Eck, 1995). During that time,
socioeconomic conditions of citizens were improving, such as median household income,
education levels, and drops in unemployment. However, crime rates were increasing.
Cohen and Felson (1979) believed that the increase in crime rates could be attributed to
changes in the routine activity patterns of U.S. citizens. An increase in non-household
activities caused by the increase in labor force participation left many houses unguarded.
These activities have shifted from private to public. Also, the availability of household
televisions and stereos increased the number of suitable targets for crime. Cohen and
Felson (1974) measured crime data from 1947 through 1974, and found that increased
non-household activities were significantly associated with increased crime rates.
Routine activities theory effectively argues that the routine activities of both
legitimate citizens and motivated offenders lead to the variation in criminal opportunities.
Spaces and neighborhoods become crime hotspots because large amounts of individuals
are attracted for reasons unrelated to criminal motivations, such as malls and airports.
The hotspots also attracted motivated offenders due to the suitable opportunity for a
criminal act. Also, an increase in the level of crime can occur if the level of guardianship
fluctuates. By framing criminal acts as the time and spatial intersection of motivated
offenders and unguarded targets, routine activities theory provides an improved
understanding for time and spatial structures of crime events.
Explanation of Behavior Settings
Both social disorganization and routine activities theory stress an importance of
the surrounding space; which has an influence over criminal activity. However, a better
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understanding of space, more specifically behavior settings, is needed to describe the
influences of criminal activity. Barker (1968) was the first researcher to originate the
idea of a behavior setting. Behavior settings have since been defined as “naturally
occurring units with standing patterns of behavior and a physical milieu that surrounds or
encloses the behavior” (Moss, 1976, pp. 215). These settings are located in time and
space. Behavior settings can include communities, neighborhoods, street corners,
buildings, lobbies, and classrooms. Schoggen (1989) stresses a behavior setting is not a
characteristic of the individual(s) involved, instead it is an “extra-individual” behavior
phenomenon; meaning the behavior setting has unique and stable characteristics that
persist even when people occupying the setting are removed and replaced with new
individuals.
Behavior settings are the environment that is external to the individual and may
influence, by enabling or constraining, his or her actions, including criminal behavior
(Block and Block, 1995). Individuals’ environments can be thought of as an arrangement
of behavior settings that they are exposed to during their day to day encounters.
Individuals’ encounters with behavior settings create perceptions of options and
prospects, called situations, in which the person may express their tendencies by making
judgments and choices resulting in actions (Wikstrom, 1998).
With this in mind, it is important to note, that some behavior settings may be
more likely than others to create situations in which a person may act unlawfully. The
above mentioned assumption aligns with the fact that crimes are not randomly
distributed, and the occurrence of a particular type of crime is usually linked to a
particular type of legal activity; for example, violence occurring between strangers
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usually happens during public activities (Wikstrom, 1991). Block and Block (1995)
conducted a study on the relationship between the locations and density of bars, taverns,
and liquor stores and the criminal behavior in the surrounding neighborhoods. They used
a “GeoArchive” data set of police, census, and liquor license information from January to
June in 1993. The data was compared to locations, crime events occurring within those
areas, and incidents occurring in the adjacent areas. To their surprise, they found the
location and density of bars, taverns, and liquor stores were not a strong indicator of
criminal activity within the neighborhood areas.
The question then becomes, what makes a behavior setting more criminogenic
than another one? Wikstrom (1998) states this can be explained by the extent to which
the setting produces three characteristics. The first are temptations, which are perceived
options for particular desires. The second is provocations; these are perceived attacks on
an individual’s property, security, or respect that evokes anger or similar emotions that
could incite unlawful aggressive responses. The final trait is weak deterrence, which are
the perceived low risks of consequences or detection generally associated with engaging
in unlawful activity in response to provocations or temptations.
Wikstrom and Sampson (2003) state, given the cultural and structural
environment, some types of behavior settings inherently produce higher levels of
temptation, provocation, and deterrence than others. However, the degree at which a
person will be tempted and provoked by a situation and the likelihood they will engage in
unlawful activity is dependent on their self-control and morality. It is also plausible that
the deterrent effect of a particular behavior setting is also dependent on the individual’s
disposition to engage in criminal activity (Wikstrom, 1998). The deterrent measures of a
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behavior setting may not play a huge factor for a person’s course of action if they have
low self-control and have little regard for the consequences of their criminal behavior
(Wikstrom, 1995). If the notion that behavior settings differ in their possible
criminogenic characteristics, then a key question that must be answered is why some
behavior settings tend to be potentially more criminogenic than others. According to
Wikstrom (1998), this can be answered by examining the role community context has in
producing behavior settings with more or less criminogenic characteristics.
Structural Characteristics within the Behavior Setting
Neighborhoods and communities vary widely in their structural characteristics
(Wikstrom and Sampson, 2003). These variations can include residential population
characteristics and compositions such as poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, family factors,
and stability of residents. However, structural characteristics also include the differences
in the characteristics and layout of buildings and spaces and their related activities
(Michelson, 1976). These include density and arrangement of the space and the presence
of buildings and spaces for non-residential use. Structural characteristics of
neighborhoods can also include the makeup and composition of the nonresidential
population of people occupying the area. That is individuals who work, but may not live
in the area, people who visit people who live within the area, or people who are attending
activities within the area. Variations in community structural characteristics are,
“fundamentally a result of processes of residential segregation and differential land use
which, in turn, are related to aspects of wider political economy, such as means of
production (technology), division of labor, and distribution of wealth (inequality)”
(Sampson, 1999, pp. 261).
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Wikstrom and Sampson (2003) argue that the social mechanisms, enabled by
structural characteristics through their impact on the community social environment,
influences individual development and actions. Wikstrom (1998) summarizes this as
resources, rules, and routines. Wikstrom’s basic premise is that the community structure
provides the rules and resources that residents take cues from in their daily lives, which in
turn influences the “patterning and content” of their daily routines, and the specific
resources and rules linked with types of behavior settings created by the community
routines. Wikstrom (2002) points out that even the most heinous criminal offenders only
spend a fraction of their time committing criminal acts, which highlight that behavior
settings may be an important factor in triggering criminal actions. Wikstrom and
Sampson (2003) state the role of community context for individual action is that it either
restricts or facilitates and guides a person’s action through the behavior settings created
by the community routines and the type of resources and rules associated to a particular
behavior setting.
The importance of community resources, rules, and routines for the explanation of
a person’s involvement in criminal activity has been established in community centered
criminological research; however, a key concept remains underdeveloped. What is
lacking is the concept that directly connects the community context to individual
development and actions (Wikstrom, 1998). Sampson and Wikstrom (2003) believe the
behavior setting is the factor that could provide such a link. Dishion, French, and
Patterson (1995) are among the few researchers that have stressed the importance of
behavior settings for the explanation of antisocial behavior. While observing deviant
behaviors in juveniles in both the home and school setting, they were able to link
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neighborhood context to early onset antisocial behavior. However, their explanation of
behavior settings is unrestrained and lumps a wide range of behavior settings which
includes neighborhoods to school classrooms. Shonkoff and Phillips (2000), who also
look at adolescent antisocial behavior, found that while family supervision of the child is
a community factor, the community context in which the families operate, are likely to
influence management strategies of the child. Based on this work, Wikstrom and
Sampson (2003) argue a person’s encounter with behavior settings, depending on the
individual’s characteristics and the characteristics of the behavior setting, will perceive
their options then make choices, and take action.
Researchers have traditionally studied the impact of collective efficacy on
behavior settings to better explain social disorganization. Sampson (2003) has
established that social mechanisms operating within behavior settings can either restrict
or facilitates people’s actions. Such mechanisms can be the deciding factor between a
behavior setting having high or low levels of temptation, provocation, and deterrence.
Using this theoretical framework, this dissertation will draw upon the social
disorganization and routine activities theories and examine a new form of social
mechanisms that are being systematically implemented within urban settings across the
United States.
In the post 9/11 era, cities have undergone urban fortification at an unprecedented
level. While studies have described the existence of anti-terrorism security areas that are
present in global cities like New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009),
Washington D.C. (Benton-Short, 2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008), none have
conducted empirical assessments on the spatial extent of security zones and their effect
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on the behavior settings in which they exist. Studies have identified the existence of
security zones (Hollander and Whitfield, 2010; Nemeth, 2010; Nemeth and Hollander,
2010), but have only provided recommendations for a balance between open public
spaces and their security. Even fewer studies provide approximations of the degree and
intensity of security zones.
Conclusion
Most research on neighborhoods and community areas have relied upon
administrative data collected by government agencies such as the Bureau of the Census.
Census data primarily covers socio-demographic characteristics such as race, poverty,
unemployment, and family structure. Other neighborhood level administrative data
includes crime reports, public health data, education, and various social service figures.
Although administrative data provides insight into neighborhood activities, they are not
useful for displaying unofficial activities. Common sources of data are ill equipped to
explain the physical property of neighborhoods such as undetected crimes, density of
business types, and security zones.
Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) describe the study of the reliability and validity
of assessing ecological units, at the neighborhood level, as ecometrics. Ecometrics is
used to measure neighborhood context/social processes primarily through direct
observation that would not normally be cataloged by the aforementioned administrative
data collection agencies (Savitiz and Raudenbush, 2009). For example, Raudenbush and
Sampson (1999) studied physical and social disorder within Chicago neighborhoods by
using such observational measures. They observed and coded city blocks for the
presence or absence of abandoned cars, graffiti, syringes, broken bottles, and other
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various forms of neighborhood garbage. Raudenbush and Sampson utilized this
observational data to produce a measure of physical disorder within the sampled
neighborhood.
In his 2012 presidential address to the American Society of Criminology, Robert
Sampson called upon researchers to utilize advances in technology to identify and
measure social phenomena across varying spatial scales. In particular, Sampson (2013)
mentioned how advances in GPS and GIS technology should be and can be adapted to
help transform how contextual research is conducted. Much like the Boston Area
Research Initiative, which provides a vast array of visual socioeconomic information
through a GIS system, ecometric research should make use of these technological
advances to better visualize and provide a more accurate neighborhood context
(Sampson, 2013).
Employing similar ecometric methods and answering Sampson’s call for GPS and
GIS integration into social research, this dissertation relies upon the direct observation of
anti-terrorism security measures occurring within the central business districts of three
U.S. cities. By using anti-terrorism security variables, such as access restrictions,
surveillance, and behavioral controls, this study will determine where these security
zones manifest themselves and measures the degree of intensity of these spaces through a
geographic information system to produce an inverse distance weighted interpolation
map. Once the intensity and extent of the security zones have been identified, this
dissertation will then compare demographic, economic, and social activity within the
identified security zones to areas outside of the identified security zones.
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This dissertation will also expand upon Sampson’s definition of social
mechanisms to include anti-terrorism security zones appearing in urban areas. And
although security zones were present prior to 2000, the drastic expansion of security
zones did not occur until after the September 11th terrorist attacks. Security zones are
essentially social mechanisms that have a purpose of regulating, reducing, and or
displacing political crime within behavior settings. The question this dissertation asks is:
are the security zones affecting demographic, economic, and social activities within the
identified security zones of Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit.
It is reasonable to expect that security zones within these three U.S. cities are
reducing and or displacing crime rates within these areas, and therefore creating a safer
space for people to live and work. Therefore, over time, economic activity should
increase within the security zones. Additionally, with lower crime rates and increased
economic activities, it could be argued that there should also be an increase in population.
The following chapter provides a detailed explanation of urban fortification and security
zone literature.
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CHAPTER THREE
FORTIFYING URBAN LANDSCAPES
Introduction
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks the privatization and fortification of
public space within cities has progressed at an unprecedented rate, especially for New
York City, London, Madrid, Mumbai, and other global cities that have a perceived threat
of future attacks (Davis, 2001; Light, 2002; Graham, 2004; Sternburg and Lee, 2006). It
should be noted that the September 11th attacks did not mark a beginning of fortifying
urban areas; however, the events after 9/11 can be seen as an example emphasizing the
ongoing historical trend of increased urban security (Coaffee, O’Hare; Hawkesworth,
2009).
From the beginning of civilization, cities have been designed to defend against
invading armies or protect its inhabitants from the elements (Forbes, 1965). As
urbanization took place, the defensive mechanisms deployed by city authorities became
more advanced in repelling intruders (Morris, 1994). The most common form of these
defense mechanisms was physical barriers such as gates, walls and ditches (Mumford,
1961). These structures, especially the city wall, produced an image of inclusion and
exclusion. The rich would live within the well defended city and the poor would live in
danger outside of the city’s defenses (Pile, Brook and Mooney, 1999). Archaeologists
have found ancient urban areas near the Nile, Tigris, Euphrates and Yangtze Rivers that
were often surrounded by ditches, walls and other defensive measures to protect
themselves from outside dangers (Morris, 1994).
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The features of a city wall, tower, and ditch has become the most conjured image
of an ancient city. These defensive features have changed very little since the creation of
Jericho until the use of gunpowder hundreds of years later (Keegan, 1993). Once cities
became more open, new defensive features began to take hold. New walls and gated
spaces started to develop within the city (Luymes, 1997). By the mid-nineteenth century
many cities featured secured residential housing for the social elite (Newman, 1980).
Finding the appropriate defense from external attacks has been an ongoing conundrum
for many urban planners (Morris, 1994).
According to Coaffee et al. (2009) cities have been characterized with feelings of
insecurity and fear of crime. As cities evolved, defensive measures became more
complex in order to cope with the ever changing strategies of invaders. Poyner (1983)
noted that castles and walled villages of Medieval Europe were prime examples of this
blueprint. Internal defenses were represented by the fortress or keep, usually surrounded
by a moat, centered in the middle of the village, while external defenses, such as a city
wall, were the first line of defense. As technology improved, the city wall and castle
became less relevant.
In many ways, modern cities are no different from their medieval counterparts.
Modern cities embed defensive features into their urban landscape. During the 1960s, the
association of urban design and defensive architecture was given widespread
consideration due to rising crime rates and the decay of high-rise residential buildings
(Newman, 1995; Gold, 2007). The most notable are the concepts of Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design and Defensible Space. These theories advocate for
controlling and/or deterring crime by “designing out” the crime through the addition or
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removal of certain physical features. These features can control access, increase
surveillance, and therefore limit the opportunity for crime to occur in these spaces.
During the 1970s and 1980s, law enforcement officials in the United Kingdom and Israel
also employed these strategies in response to terrorist attacks (Brown, 1985; Coaffee,
2009).
The 1990s saw a further increase in violent crime along with various racial
conflicts which furthered segregation within the urban landscape (McLaughlin; Muncie,
1999). This was also fueled by numerous fortification and surveillance features popping
up within cities during the 1990s. Common urban fortifications can include everything
from gated communities, walls, doors, and bollards to Jersey barriers, surveillance
cameras, narrowed or obscured entrances, and manned security booths. Commercial
plazas, neighborhoods, retail stores, entertainment districts, and public facilities were
fortified due to the policy actions of urban authorities, business owners, and wealthy
citizens (Fyfe, 1997; Davis, 1998). Mike Davis (1995) argued cities were becoming
alarmingly fortified and have become places of terror rather than public spaces. Davis
believed the city was becoming militarized and was transforming into a place that policed
social boundaries through architecture (Davis, 1995).
Perceptions of fear among city residents helped increase the trend towards urban
fortification (Glassner, 2000; Furedi, 2002). Citizens living in city areas perceived to be
at risk of criminal activity construct defensive regions to protect themselves (Ellin, 1997).
These urban fortifications are costly, which divides the rich from the poor. Many
researchers have argued that present day life in the city has changed and that certain
members of society have sealed themselves away from the rest of the city. This sealing
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away creates a new type of privatized space which does not allow the same level of
access to all members of society (Sorkin, 1992; Atkinson and Helms, 2007).
In the past several decades the urban landscape has been repurposed and
restructured due to political processes at the local and global levels that continue to
separate cities into individual territories, cultures, and economies (Graham and Marvin
2001; Coaffee and Murakami-Wood, 2006). The idea of segregating and restructuring
sections of the city in the attempt to group certain areas for socioeconomic advantages is
nothing new (Graham, 2004; Coaffee, Murakami-Wood and Rogers, 2008). These
groupings have formed financial, civic and cultural districts or enclaves within the city.
This grouping phenomenon has increased in recent years due to the increased fear of
crime and terrorism in urban areas as well as recent economic struggles between cities
(Savitch; Coaffee and Rogers 2008).
The fortification and privatization of public space is the common response when
city dwellers are fearful of criminal acts (Ellin, 1997). As a result of an increased
perception of crime, or potential act of terrorism experienced by inhabitants of a
particular area, fortification and privatization occurs, which leads to the modifying or
repurposing of the physical form in an urban landscape (Graham, 2002; Coaffee 2005;
2006). This perception has led to a number of fortified urban features in many U.S.
cities. These features can range from the removal of city benches to curtail the homeless
living on the street, to the extreme of gated and guarded commercial and residential areas
(Davis, 1990; Flusty 1994).
Although it may not be as obvious, contemporary cities have their own emphasis
on defense. During the last several decades, many defensive measures have been
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employed to respond to rising crime rates and the fear of crime, escalating social
conflicts, increased racial and ethnic tensions, and the increase of attacks by terrorist
groups against urban infrastructure. These risks have led to urban authorities deploying
sophisticated surveillance, advanced security management plans, and urban fortification
measures. These fortification measures have commonly been described as the fortress
city, walled city, and gated communities. These security features reduce public access,
enhance surveillance and have a number of security personnel patrolling these areas.
These measures invoke notions of unfair spatial control of a certain urban area by certain
social groups (Coaffee et al., 2009).
Public Space
Public space is essential for the livelihood of cities. Public spaces are sites of
interaction in which individuals cooperate with one another. Cities are full of freely
accessible spaces allowing for planned or unplanned encounters and activities. Public
spaces can be seen as educating city inhabitants about one another (Lofland, 2000). In
order to be successful, public spaces must be unconditionally accessible and inclusive,
while encouraging interaction between acquaintances and strangers (Kohn, 2004). Public
spaces serve as a location where social interactions and public activities can occur for all
members of the public (Mitchell, 2003).
This concept of public space has been long accepted by many urban theorists.
Wirth (1938) argued that the city is an urban stage and a protector of freedom and
tolerance. Jacobs (1961) believed that urban planners could increase sociability by
prioritizing street level action within neighborhoods like Greenwich Village, New York
during the mid-twentieth century. Rapoport (1977) contends that cities must
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accommodate a diversity of uses and users by remaining adaptable and flexible. In 1974,
Henri Lefebvre published The Production of Space. Lefebvre’s central argument is that
space is a process, or is constantly being produced, as opposed to an inanimate object.
He does not accept the traditional belief of space being a physical area that is simply
inhabited. Instead, Lefebvre argues that actions and relations among people and
processes join together to produce space (Lefebvre, 1991). Public spaces allow for city
inhabitants to engage in a social life. Marcuse (2006) states public spaces are alive,
diverse, and accessible to all and are symbols of a truly democratic city.
However, while urban planners are attempting to attract a certain type of citizen,
it comes at the expense of other less desired individuals. As public space is increasingly
organized around consumerism, individuals who contribute by purchasing goods and
services are welcomed, while those who do not or are unable are discouraged (Fyfe and
Bannister, 1998; Turner, 2002). Fyfe (1998) argues “purifying” and privatizing public
spaces to support consumerism, at the expense of others, contributes to social exclusions
and a sense of inequality for people. Critics who deplore the loss of pubic space are also
concerned with the reduction of a democratic public sphere rather than the loss of actual
physical public space (Sorkin, 1992; Mitchell, 2003; Kohn, 2004).
Blomley (2001) argues that public space only manifests itself when it is the site of
the development of the public sphere and can only do so if it is occupied or actively
creating public space for use as a political forum. The public space and the political
public sphere relationship are based on the understanding of citizenship and the
perception of who is represented in the public sphere or who occupies public space.
Representation and citizenship are related to visibility and making physical appearances
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in public space (Young, 1990). Mitchell (1995: 15) states, “By claiming space in public,
by creating public space, social groups themselves become public.” Public spaces are the
center of power and politics and provide many opportunities for interaction and
representation (Gould, 1996). The model of open freedom enables flow of dialogue,
promoting active citizenship and enabling political representation. Open cities are the
forum for dissent and protest and where diverse users can state and discuss opposing
opinions and viewpoints.
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design
During the 1960s and 1970s, defensive architecture through urban design was
widely employed by urban planners in the United States as a result of research which
suggested an association between particular types of environmental design and reduction
of criminal activity (Gold, 1970). These designs produced concerns that fortifying the
urban environment was socially and economically detrimental and that the providers of
urban security were starting to become privatized due to the lack of faith with municipal
authorities to properly provide security within the urban environment. Robert Gold
(1970) noted that the urban environment was being fortified due to demands from
citizens and that safety had become a commodity that was being bought and sold with
real estate.
Jane Jacobs was the first sociologist to propose analyzing the relationship
between the physical environment and crime. Jacobs (1961) noted in The Death and Life
of Great American Cities how urban design could jeopardize community safety. Her
research criticized the urban renewal and slum clearance practices in the 1950s. Jacobs
(1961) found the urban planning practices as unnecessary and destroying older
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neighborhoods. Jacobs argued the older structures provided natural security techniques
that were useful for the communities being studied. For example, she referenced
structures that were close to the street like stoops, porches, and street level windows,
which allowed community members to bond and establish a sense of community.
Removing these structures would decrease the ability to identify strangers, reduce social
interaction and decrease the sense of overall security felt by community members. As a
result of these safety concerns, urban designers researched strategies to limit the
opportunity of crime.
This shift of concern was also in response to the race riots which plagued cities in
the late 1960s, as well as the problems associated with design of high rise blocks, which
were perceived as breeding grounds for criminal activity (Coaffee et al., 2009). These
high rise apartments were described as “indefensible space” (Newman, 1972). Urban
planners began to research how the manipulation of the physical environment could
produce space that would limit and even suppress criminal behavior, especially
opportunistic criminal activities.
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) was developed by
criminologist C. Ray Jeffery in 1971. He suggested that the physical environment could
be modified to produce space which would discourage criminal activity while at the same
time maintaining social cohesion amongst law abiding citizens. CPTED is based on four
elements: natural surveillance, natural access control, territorial reinforcement, and
maintenance. Natural surveillance is a design concept with the primary purpose of
keeping people under observation. This can involve certain placement and design of
windows, lighting, and landscaping features to deter criminal activity, through increased
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observation, while providing space which encourages positive social interaction. Natural
access control utilizes elements such as doors, shrubs, fences, and gates to deter
admission to a target and or victim and create a perception among potential offenders that
there is a substantial risk in selecting the target/victim. Jeffery’s third element of CPTED
is territorial reinforcement. The surrounding environment can be designed to clearly
establish public and private spaces to the public. Low walls, landscaping, and pavement
patterns can create a sense of ownership which would then be perceived by would-be
criminal offenders to stay away. The final element is maintenance. Jeffery ties
maintenance into the Broken Windows Theory. Deterioration of a space could indicate
less control and concern by the owner and indicates a greater tolerance of disorder.
Proper care and maintenance allows for the use of the space for its intended purpose.
These elements would reduce opportunities for criminal activity to be committed and
which would potentially reduce the level of fear of crime (Jeffery, 1971). In later works,
Jeffery (1978) believed that in order to reduce criminal activity the environment must be
changed instead of spending time attempting to rehabilitate criminals.
Jeffery’s work was soon followed by a number of studies on architectural crime
deterrence. Of all these studies, none evoked more debate than the publication of Oscar
Newman’s Defensible Space – Crime Prevention through Urban Design. This crime
control model, which draws mainly upon Jeffery’s crime prevention through
environmental design theory, is also based out of the public health model. Rather than
waiting for a particular disease to attack, Newman focuses on prevention and early
diagnosis. Newman’s defensible space theory engages in crime control, as well as trying
to understand the underlying characteristics of high crime neighborhoods in order to more
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effectively combat crime. Newman’s work is also based upon Skinner’s operant learning
theory. People respond to the environment in a particular way in order to maximize
pleasure and to minimize pain. Newman believed by removing reinforcements for
criminal behavior, the individual will not respond to an environmental stimulus to
commit a criminal act, therefore reducing crime.
Newman’s research on housing in New York and St. Louis led to the concept of
defensible space. Defensible space calls for thoughtful design strategies, with certain
spatial features, to allow for residents to become key managers in ensuring their security.
This concept can involve using a wide array of mechanisms, real and symbolic barriers as
well as increased surveillance, which when combined would enable residents to be in
control of the physical environment (Newman, 1972). Defensible space was viewed as
an expression of social fabric that could defend itself and could be achieved by the
manipulation or repurposing of architectural and design principles (Coaffee et al., 2009).
Newman also suggested that security fences and electronic surveillance technologies
could be employed, but only as a last resort. Defensible space is an alternative to target
hardening measures which can include screening visitors, patrolling security guards and
installing iron bars on doors and windows. These target hardening measures can make
public space uncomfortable and discourage a sense of community.
Newman (1972) noted that anonymity within the city was associated with rises in
the crime rate. His research utilized crime statistics collected by the New York Police
Department as well as his own data collected through resident interviews and building
analysis. He found increased crime rates in high rise apartment buildings when compared
to lower rise buildings. In high-rise buildings, 55 percent of criminal acts were

41

committed within interior spaces, when only 17 per percent of crime were committed in
low-rise buildings in interior spaces (Newman, 1972). Newman concluded that high rise
building residents had little to no control or personal responsibility for spaces that were
occupied by so many people. With the increased sense of anonymity and danger that
urban life involved, especially for residents in high rise apartments that did not appear to
know or want to know each other, neighborhood crime prevention was made nearly
impossible.
The defensible space concept stresses physical communities of interest that have a
common use for the space surrounding their environment. If there is no community of
interest, the space becomes unused and unsafe. Therefore, a police presence can
increase, and transform the space into a highly used semiprivate space; which could also
be identified with a particular group of people, such as gangs, who use, maintain, and
control it (Newman, 1980). This would convert public space into a militarized
semiprivate space. The new semiprivate space would not limit access to non-residents,
but attempt to ensure a well defined terrain by non-residents that would need the approval
of the current resident population and meet their criteria of appropriate usage for nonresidents (Newman, 1980).
Newman’s main premise was that most criminal offenders behave logically by
selecting targets in relation to perceptions of high rewards and a low risk of getting
caught. Therefore crime deterrence was basically about giving potential criminal
offenders a sense that if they invade a certain space, or boundary, they were likely to be
observed and would have a difficult time escaping undetected. Newman argued that
outside spaces become more defensible if they are marked off with physical boundaries,
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such as a fence or shrubbery, and were well illuminated. However, space becomes
indefensible when solid fences and tall walls are constructed; due to these objects serving
as hiding places for would be criminals.
Newman offered four design features that would create a secure residential
environment: first, territoriality, which is achieved by the zoning of public space, mainly
residential areas, to encourage a sense of community; second, natural surveillance, this
occurs by designing the placement of people, activities, and physical features in such a
way to maximize visibility; third, image, which is the capacity of the structural design to
provide a sense of security; and finally, milieu, these are other physical features in the
landscape that can be modified so they merge with areas of the city considered to be safe,
such as police stations, or commercial areas. Jacobs (1961) also advocated for mixed
land use within the city to promote greater safety.
Newman’s defensible space theories became a popular concept in the design of
new residential communities, and were also used by many law enforcement agencies in
the United Kingdom in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Coleman 1984, 1985; Dawson
1984; Goodey and Gold, 1987). Coleman (1984; 1985) proposed that the physical design
of high rise housing in London and Oxford had a significant effect on the behavior of its
residents and that more optimal conditions could be obtained by reorganizing access and
layouts to housing estates to give residents more control over their immediate
environment. These concepts became popular with local British governments as they
adopted highly restrictive ordinances in order to curtail their worst housing estates
(Goodey and Gold, 1987).
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Newman’s theory was not without flaws. Practically, the principles of defensible
space are simple to implement, but it’s not always economical or possible to repurpose
existing spaces. The defensible space theory also suffered from theoretical problems as
well. Gold (1982) was highly critical of Newman’s defensible space theory, indicating
that there were poor statistical analyses and unverifiable causal relationships between
physical design and crime. Many researchers (Mayhew, 1979; Poyner, 1983;
Mandanipour, 1996; Tijerino, 1998) also had difficulty in accepting Newman’s modified
belief of environmental determinism. Hillier (1973) argued architectural design did not
shape social behavior and that territoriality was not the main explanation for spatial
behavior.
Several critics also believed Newman’s methods were methodologically flawed.
Mawby (1977) found Newman’s research to be misleading; his research found London
high-rise apartments did not have a higher crime rate when compared to low-rise
apartments. Mayhew (1979) also discovered the defensible space principles did not
apply to cities in the United Kingdom. Taylor, Gottfredson, and Brower (1980) stated the
defensible space concept had many flawed and untested assumptions. Taylor, et al
(1980) points out one of the major flaws in Newman’s concept, showing that the
surveillance aspect of the theory rested on the assumption that residents will engage in a
policing function by making use of surveillance. Mayhew (1979) confirmed their
findings, stating only citizens empowered with the task, such as police, firemen, etc., will
engage in surveillance.
Greenberg and Rohe (1984) conducted an empirical test analyzing the
effectiveness of Newman’s defensible space theory and Jeffrey’s and Brantingham’s
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target and opportunity model. Greenberg and Rohe found less supportive evidence for
Newman’s model, and more for the target and opportunity model. Their study looked at
the distribution of targets in relation to streets, vacant lots, housing units, commercial
buildings, and parking lots experiencing high crime rates. They found low volume
streets, single-family homes, and a select few vacant plots and parking lots had lower
crime rates.
Another problem often associated with the defensible space model is the problem
of displacement. By deterring crime originating in one locale, the motivated offender
may simply choose an alternate target. Therefore, the criminal act is merely displaced
and not prevented. Siegel (1995) suggests that environmental crime prevention may only
produce short term benefits, but once criminals adjust their behavior to the new measures
they will continue in criminal behavior.
Newman’s defensible space model has influenced many theories and crime
prevention projects. In a more extreme case of architectural crime prevention, Poyner
(1983), who took many queues from Newman’s work, proposed a simplistic architectural
solution for every kind of criminal act. Poyner stated that the layout of streets,
neighborhoods, and communities could be designed in such a way to eliminate all
criminal activity, although he never specifies what type of crime he is attempting to
suppress. He also advocates for the suppression of semi-public environments, such as
platforms and decks, and a militaristic regulation of children density in personal
residences. Poyner envisioned a city where every facet of urban life could be observed
and controlled.
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Another crime prevention strategy which borrows heavily from Newman’s model
is situational crime prevention. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1986) asserted that criminality
is a necessary condition, this alone is not sufficient for a criminal act to be committed;
instead, crime requires situational incentives found in the form of motivation and
opportunity. Ronald Clarke became the most significant contributor to the situational
crime prevention model. Clarke (1983) focused the theory on the immediate physical and
social settings, as well as the societal arrangements, rather than the individual perpetrator.
Thereby, decreasing the amount of opportunities for crime by using specific measures,
such as the management, design, or manipulation of the environment, for certain crimes,
is a more effective approach than reforming the offender themselves (Clarke, 1983). His
crime prevention strategies were originally divided into three types of measures: target
hardening measures, environmental management, and degree of surveillance. The
foundation of situational crime prevention relies upon the assumption that more
opportunities lead to more criminal acts.
The main strength of situational crime prevention is the scope of criminal acts of
which it can be applied. The core principles are deliberately broad and the prevention
strategies can be applied to a wide array of crimes. This applies to crimes that are
political in nature, emotionally driven, opportunistic, sexual, or premeditated; they are all
affected by situational characteristics. For instance, homicide rates are heavily
influenced by the easiness and accessibility of handguns. The higher the availability, the
higher the homicide rates (Clare, 1997). Situational crime prevention relies on a broad
collection of literature to support different crime prevention measures.
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Poyner and Webb (1987) found that in increased utilization of access controls in
British buildings, including fences and automated access to buildings reduced the amount
of vandalism and theft when compared to buildings not using access controls. Hunter
and Jeffery (1992) concluded that having two clerks on duty in convenience stores,
especially during night hours, was an effective prevention against robberies. Both of
these studies are examples of controlling access to facilities and increasing surveillance
and place mangers to reduce the potential of crime, key components of the situational
crime prevention model. Researchers Birkbeck and LaFree (1993) determined that
threat, frustration, and reward were continually found as situational correlates of crime,
as well as the subjective experiences of the perpetrator. According to their study,
criminals choose, weigh, check, suspend, and alter the meanings of the situations they
experience.
The approach of environmental management, when the main objectives are
independent of crime control, can also produce effective crime prevention measures. In
the United Kingdom, laws requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets were enacted to
reduce fatal motorcycle accidents, but it has also indirectly reduced motorcycle thefts as
thieves were unlikely to have a spare helmet and would be stopped and arrested by law
enforcement (Mayhew, Clarke, Sturman, and Hough, 1976). Clarke (1995) argued that
criminal conduct was found to be influenced more by changes in opportunity and external
motivations. Research conducted by Scarr, 1973; Reppetto, 1974; and Waller and
Okihiro, 1978, support Clarke’s argument through a series of interviews with convicted
residential burglars which found that the avoidance of risk and minimizing effort is a key
component of target selections decisions.
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Situational crime prevention has also been largely criticized over the years. Much
like the criticisms of the defensible space model, displacement has been the main
argument against situational crime prevention. It is argued that the situational aspects of
the theory may determine the timing and location of criminal acts, but reducing
opportunities in a certain time and place results in displacing offenders to other times,
places, or crimes with no net reduction in criminal acts (Clarke and Feslon, 1993).
Displacement occurs when an offender may attempt to commit the crime elsewhere, at a
different time, choose a different target or victim, or engage in a different type of crime
(Reppetto, 1976).
Other studies have also concluded that the displacement of criminal acts does
occur and that situational prevention measures were a waste of time and resources.
Mayhew et al. (1976) found reducing the potential for theft for new vehicles in the United
Kingdom simply lead to older vehicles experiencing higher rates of theft. Allatt (1984)
established that target hardening techniques employed in a particular United Kingdom
neighborhood decreased burglaries in the neighborhood, but was soon followed by an
increase in property crimes in the surrounding neighborhoods. Several studies examined
the relationship between the allocations of police resources and the distribution of crime.
In these studies, it was believed that areas with a decreased police presence would have
higher crime rates due to offenders being spatially displaced. This test was conducted for
approximately 50 U.S. cites. It was found that areas with a lower police presence did
experience higher crime rates, especially for property crimes (Mehay, 1977 and
Fabrikant, 1980).
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Another argument against situational crime prevention is the cost of employing
such crime measures. Some techniques may be too expensive or unavailable to the
average citizen. Shover (1991) collected data on imprisoned property offenders on the
effectiveness of various security measures. He found the most effective crime prevention
measures to be burglar alarms, electronic window sensors, CCTV cameras, and security
patrols.
While CPTED, defensible space, and situational crime prevention may make
places safer, the question remains as to whether people feel any safer in these secured
environments. An urban dweller may be statistically less likely to experience a criminal
act, but the person may not feel any safer. Newman’s (1973) research found that constant
surveillance in a particular space made pedestrians feel as if they were a hostile stranger
who should not be in the fortified space.
Since the work of Jeffery and Newman, CPTED and defensible space concepts have
evolved over time to include new measures that include advanced technologies such as
closed circuit television, access control, and tactics which include target hardening, to
augment the natural surveillance of space (Moffat, 1983; Crowe, 2000). Community
safety is a far reaching issue, one of which many urban leaders and planners are
attempting to create sustainable communities and to secure public spaces (Coaffee,
Moore, Fletcher and Bosher, 2008).
No Right to the City
Many researchers (Boddy, 2008; Purcell, 2008; Marcuse, 2005; Warren, 2002)
argue that having a fortified public space erodes many public rights and privileges. The
concept of “right to the city” was first introduced by Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre (1968)
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explained a right to the city is composed of three interrelated entitlements: the right to
access physical urban space; the right to be social and interact with others; and the right
to create space. The first right allows anyone to be in public space. However, this right
to the city has been disrupted due to the modification of the physical urban landscape.
These changes in the landscape are the most visible expression of urban security.
Benton-Short (2007) argued that post September 11th fortifications or architectures of
terror, have created a segregated society. These fortified landscapes are mostly found in
densely populated cities which produce architecture of dis-assurance (Boddy, 2008).
Architecture of dis-assurance is the sudden transformation of public space into defensive
security measures, which in turn leaves surrounding residents questioning their own
safety. Boddy (2008) explains the Jersey barrier (Figure 1) is the most common form of
this type of architecture. He contrasts this visible security with passive-aggressive or
invisible security measures. These invisible features, such as artificial waterfalls used as
a dividing walls or a building wrapping moats, are becoming more common and are now
a statutory code requirement in some new development projects which include One
World Trade Center also known as the Freedom Tower.
The second right to the city is the ability to live an urban lifestyle. For example, a
cosmopolitan lifestyle that provides the option to engage in interaction or to retreat into
anonymity. Marcuse (2005) believes this right allows people to live a diverse lifestyle
where people gather to encounter one another and exchange ideas. This lifestyle is
potentially threatened by fortifications within the city and can create fear and distrust
among inhabitants. Davis (1990) contends that “the social perception or threat becomes a
function of the security mobilization itself, not crime rates” (page 224). The National
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Capital Panning Commission (NCPC) reported in 2002 that a rapid and severe
mobilization of urban security measures would increase fear and undermine the basic
assumptions of an open and democratic society.
The third right to the city involves the ability to produce space and determine ones
use of the space (Young, 1990). This can entail suitable representation, participation and
appropriation, and involves access to decision making processes (Purcell, 2008).
However, when this right is invoked it is often in defiance of the owners, managers, or
authorities who seek to limit undesirable actions in public space. These undesirable
actions include acts of protest, dissent, or resistance to hegemonic powers threatening this
right of representation (Mitchell, 2003). The curtailment of this right can also refer to the
reduced use of public space by certain populations, especially those wishing to express
political dissent or wanting to exercise their freedom of assembly. The War on Terror is
a perfect example of this right restriction. Warren (2002) argues that city officials use
security concerns to justify the “repression, prevention and control” of city inhabitants
wanting to engage in political mobilization activities. The right to the city concept allows
one to understand that public space is linked to the creation of a public realm, and that the
public realm is being eroded by an inclusive and or exclusive form of public space. With
the implementation of anti-terror security measures, which are meant to protect
inhabitants and key infrastructure, are potentially homogenizing and normalizing space
and denying the right for a true experience of urban life (Flusty, 1994; Savitch, 2008).
Privatization, Urban Fortification, and Anti-Terrorism Security
Critics believe that the privatization of public space points to the loss of the public
realm and the erosion of democratic expression and that privatized spaces prioritizes
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citizens, as opposed to fostering interaction among diverse social groups (Crawford,
1992; Kohn, 2004). However, Garvin (2002) supports the use of private sector entities
to aid public needs in urban spaces, mainly due to the ability of these entities to
rejuvenate deteriorating urban centers. With current re-development efforts in U.S.
cities, municipalities are allowing for private investment entities to create and manage
open spaces. However, it must be noted there are consequences of public spaces that are
owned and managed by entities other than the government.
Banerjee (2001) offered three critical trends that add to the recent increase in
privatized urban spaces. The first trend involves the increased use of private entities,
rather than the government agencies, to provide public goods and services. This parallels
the government’s recent reduction in providing services to the public (Banerjee, 2001).
The second is the expansion of transnational corporations and their focus on the global
economy over local interests. According to this trend, cities are viewed only as places of
investment, rather than sites of social collaboration. The final trend Banerjee states that
is the advancement of technology and communication has transformed social interactions
and altered traditional beliefs of place and location.
While researching gated communities, Low (2003) found cities have a strong
incentive to privatize public spaces, because developers then take over accountability for
constructing and maintaining infrastructures such as roads or providing services such as
security patrols or trash collection. Low (2003) also found residents living within
privatized spaces experienced a heightened sense of fear and insecurity due to a lack of
social interaction. Kohn (2004) argues that the privatization of public space is the
warning sign for the disintegration of the public realm. He believes privatized spaces can
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prioritize public consumption for specific urban dwellers, as opposed to allowing diverse
groups access to these spaces. Valentine (1996) and Wilson (1991) have both found
some public spaces can constrain female use and reinforce oppressive gender relations.
Many researchers believe, with governmental approval of the privatization of public
space, it will lead to the total withdrawal of citizens from the civic realm leading to the
“end of public space.” (Banerjee, 2001; Kohn, 2004; Sorkin, 1992).
Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, public and private officials have pushed
for implementation of anti-terror security as the rationale for increased security and
fortification of streets, sidewalks and public spaces (Mitchell, 2003). Urban
administrators use the threat of a potential terrorist attack as their justification to increase
security measures for many public buildings (Nemeth and Hollander, 2010). Some claim
the security measures used limit civil liberties by controlling behavior, restricting
movement and eroding the quality of life in cities (Marcuse, 2002). Savitch (2008)
believed security enhancements allow for ensuring certainty, order and homogeneity.
However, the essence of a city lies in its diversity, openness and difference; without the
opportunity to interact with other city dwellers urban life becomes no more (Savitch,
2008).
Marcuse (2002) describes how high profile public space has become noticeably
less public due to city officials limiting access, controlling and inhibiting activities which
are considered “normal to a democratic society.” Marcuse (2006) explains the city has
now been secured from the public rather than for the public. Both Graham (2004) and
Marcuse (2004; 2006) believe that anti-terror policies are used to curtail rights and
undermine public dissent, social activism and protest. Warren (2002) argues the public
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officials implementing the War on Terror have covertly used policies to legitimize the
repression and control of mass political mobilization within cities.
Marcuse (2006) provides the key difference between safety and security: safety
refers to the actual protection from danger while security is the perceived protection from
danger. Marcuse explains how anti-terror officials employ a rhetoric of security to create
limitations on the right to public space. However, a recent study by Nemeth and
Hollander (2010) has shown that levels of fear in public space do not always decrease as
security increases, as well as an increase in safety does not always increase feelings of
overall security. Koskela (2008) argues that urban fear is produced from threats of
global, ideological terror rather than from the risk of local or petty crime. While an
individual can avoid certain situations that jeopardize their safety, threats of terror,
according to Koskela (2008), is perceived to be out of the public’s control.
Federal planners and designers are tasked with designing out terror, which creates
a situation of “form follows fear” (Ellin, 1997). Creating feelings of safety is a critical
component of successful urban projects (Talen, 2008), but critics often point out how
secured spaces within cities increase fear and distrust. The fundamental question urban
planners must ask themselves is how to balance anti-terror measures to secure city space
and reduce public fear while not making inhabitants feel less safe. As Davis (1990)
explains, the social perception of danger becomes a function of the security mobilization,
and not actual criminal acts. Nemeth and Hollander (2010) also contend that over
secured public spaces has a negative impact on the marginal groups of our society;
mainly the poor, ethnic minorities, and the homeless.
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Boddy (2008) explains how there are two types of security present in cities. The
first type of security is described as “an architecture of dis-assurance,” which is most
commonly associated with obvious physical barriers. These include Jersey barriers,
surveillance cameras and bollards (Figure 2) which are easily perceived symbols of
security; however, they may not be effective at preventing an actual terrorist attack.
The second type of security is called “a passive-aggressive urban design style.”
This includes defensive measures such as tiered open space plazas surrounding high
value buildings to prevent truck bombs or a city street constructed of composite fill which
is set to collapse under the extreme weight of a truck carrying a bomb. These new
security measures are starting to become the norm in major global cities.
The Emergence of Security Zones
The first notable appearance of a security zone appeared in 1983 with the
installation of a Jersey barrier in front of the White House in response to the Beirut
barracks bombings. However, security zones did not fully develop until 1995, in answer
to the Oklahoma City bombing, when security officials closed off Pennsylvania Avenue
in front of the White House. The federal government’s street closing was generally
criticized as having a “bunker mentality” (Hoffman and Chalk, 2002).
Cities are dependent upon an open, diverse and tolerant environment, and the
most observable security measures often increase fear, minimize the public realm and rob
the city of its openness and vibrancy (Savitch, 2008). The National Capital Planning
Commission (NCPC) expressed concern that implementing visible security measures
would increase fear and undermine the basic premises of the city being an open and
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democratic society (Boddy, 2008). Unfortunately, federal planners mainly install visible
security measures, such as a Jersey barrier or bollard, to harden potential targets.
After the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Buildings in Oklahoma
City, OK, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), whose primary purpose is to
manage and support the basic functioning of federal agencies, produced a report
suggesting that all government buildings be identified as “public assets” and should be
retrofitted with perimeter security measures responding to an explicit set of criteria
(GSA, 1999). Shortly after the GSA’s report, the NCPC (2002) developed the first
perimeter security standards for the Federal Triangle in Washington D.C., and later added
upon these standards in 2005. It should be noted that the Federal Triangle is a triangular
area in Washington D.C. which houses key Federal agencies including: the Federal Trade
Commission, National Archives Building, Department of Justice Headquarters,
Department of Commerce Headquarters, the Environmental Protection Agency as well as
a the Federal Triangle Metro Station. Since the Oklahoma City Bombing, many of the
pedestrian areas within the Federal Triangle have been restricted to federal employees or
those with official business. The National Capital Planning Commission’s 2005
signature planning report includes explicit terminology of security zones which are
referred to as a secured “layer” of perimeter space around public buildings. The layer of
perimeter space concept was quickly adopted by federal agencies and cities around the
country (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005).
The NCPC defined a space by breaking it into three separate zones: the building
yard, the sidewalk, and finally the curb or parking lane. A particular site is divided to
allow distance requirements to protect a building from an explosion detonated from the
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street or sidewalk. Each security zone is subject to different levels of public uses,
obstruction and surveillance. Security zones were originally designed to improve the
safety of the building and its occupants, with no consideration for social, economic,
aesthetic, or transportation considerations. Both the concept and mechanisms of security
zones were intended to be temporary; however, Coaffee et al. (2009) argues security
zones have started to establish permanence in the contemporary urban landscape.
Security zones are considered a specialized category of land use called marginal
spaces (Hollander and Whitfield, 2005). Conventional open spaces are designed; such as
parks and plazas. However, marginal spaces are created as by-products of urban spatial
development and remain as inferior spaces (Garde, 1999). Zoning, security requirements,
and land use regulations typically result in marginal spaces. The central problem of
security zones is they are not normally designed or planned for. Instead they instantly
materialize or evolve on a site and create a unique problem for urban spaces. Marginal
spaces are argued to have negative impacts on city blocks, neighborhoods, and urban
space in general (Garde, 1999). Marginal spaces reduce the number of productive uses
for urban areas. Security zones are marginal spaces developed as a result of enhancing
the security of urban space. As with other marginal spaces, security zones have negative
impacts. Security zones intensify the discomforting nature of marginal spaces (Garde,
1999). These spaces can turn a bustling, dynamic street into a deserted town. Active
shopping centers are turned into empty storefronts. Security zones and restricted roads
can scare people and businesses away for blocks.
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The Fortified City
The response to urban insecurity has been dramatic, particularly in Los Angeles,
CA during the late 1980s and early 1990s, where some have argued that the
implementation of anti-crime measures had been taken to the extreme (Coaffee, 2009).
During that time, Los Angeles was portrayed as an urban testing ground, with an
overemphasis on urban militarization and extreme anti-crime measures (Davis, 1990;
1995; 1998; Flusty, 1994; and Crawford, 1995). The obsession with urban security lead
to these anti-crime measures manifesting themselves into the urban landscape. For
example, Blakely and Snyder (1995) found that 16 percent of Los Angeles residents were
living in some form of a secured access setting. The transformation of Los Angeles into
a fortress city also reflected the middle class paranoia combined with the necessity of
economic activity. It has been argued that the privatization of public space and
implemented security measures was a systemic effort by corporate Los Angeles to protect
its economic interests by excluding individuals and groups who were not necessary, or
dangerous, to the continuing profit margin of the city’s new globalized economy
(Haywood, 2004).
Mike Davis is the primary researcher who outlined how urban authorities and
private citizen groups in Los Angeles responded to the increase fear of crime by
militarizing the urban landscape. In City of Quartz (1990), Davis portrays Los Angeles
as a miserable and oppressed place, with the Los Angeles Police Department engaged in
territorial defensive measures. Davis (1990) explains how urban design, architecture, and
the police apparatus are merged into a comprehensive security effort.
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The fortification of commercial buildings and their borders become strongpoints
of sale (Flusty 1994). Coaffee (2009) notes defensible space, which is primarily utilized
on a micro level scale, is employed at a meso and macro level scale in Los Angeles. This
wide scale use of defensible space is employed primarily to protect city properties and
residences through target hardening and various forms of surveillance. Davis (1990)
maintains the militarization of Los Angeles leads to an increase of repression in public
access and movement. Haywood (2004) also compares how security and surveillance in
Los Angeles are as valuable as floor space; while the community, instead of making
investments in health and education, are forced to invest in physical security measures
instead.
Los Angeles, with its intensified security apparatus, has often been described as
postmodern urbanism (Dear and Flusty, 1998; Dear, 1999). Davis portrays fear and
anxiety in Los Angeles as an outcome of economic disparities created by the negative
consequences of increased capitalism. Dear and Flusty’s (1998) explanation of
postmodern urbanism within Los Angeles is focused on the social, political, and
economic inequalities appearing in fortified and privatized spaces.
Steven Flusty (1994) elaborates on Davis’s work by arguing that an extensive
cloud of security and surveillance has covered Los Angeles, and attempts to understand
this phenomenon by categorizing the different types of fortified space. Flusty refers to
these fortified security spaces as “interdictory space,” which is primarily designed to
intercept, repel and or filter individuals. The five types of interdictory spaces are:
stealthy space, which is often hidden from normal view by buildings and is a passive
aggressive design measure; slippery space, which cannot normally be accessed by

59

uninterrupted approaches; crusty space, which is block by walls, barriers, and
checkpoints; prickly space, are areas that are uncomfortable to occupy; and finally jittery
space, which are areas pervasive with surveillance devices.
Although Davis has influenced academics studying urban fortification, he has also
had his share of critics. The main criticism is that Davis was selling fear and anxiety
about living in Los Angeles (Stewart, 1998). Friedman (1998) also expands this
argument by stating Los Angeles is painted as the most dangerous city in the United
States. Despite the landscape of fear present in Angeles, other researchers stress these
defensive trends are not widespread and appear to be localized to Los Angeles
(Merrifield, 1997).
Planning for Urban Security
In order to gain a better understanding on how the physical security landscape is
defined and validated, existing management policies governing security zones must be
reviewed. Due to the risk of exposing confidential information to the public, security
zones on public or private spaces are not officially listed on zoning or planning
documents. However, the planning and application of security zones does not occur
without specific guidelines. For example, current and future Department of Defense
facilities are now designed and upgraded for progressive collapse avoidance, have
minimum standoff distances for personnel and vehicles, building overhang avoidance and
or hardening, mailroom modification or relocation for isolation and ventilation purposes,
building and structural isolation (decentralization), as well as mandatory polyvinylbutyral glazing of all windows and skylights for high impact projectile resistance. These
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are only several examples from the recently adopted Department of Defense Minimum
Antiterrorism Standards.
Urban security policy has become decentralized since the September 11th terrorist
attacks (Ervin, 2009). Since the federal government does not have a specific organization
that deals with urban security, each city has its own guidelines for dealing with perceived
terrorist threats (Bugliarello, 2005). Unfortunately, even the largest municipalities are
not properly equipped to develop and implement a comprehensive urban security policy.
Therefore, many cities have called upon the private sector to support such urban security
agendas. Due to the fact that many key urban assets are owned and operated by the
private sector, they have become responsible for preventing acts of terrorism on their
properties. Critical homeland security operations have shifted from governmental to
nongovernmental organizations and the obligation of combating terrorist threats is now
placed upon developers, businesses and other civil societal entities (Bugliarello, 2005).
Governments have created public and private partnerships which are designed to
address terrorism by the free sharing of information between these partnerships. For
example, New York City engages in interagency coordination to allow private sector
security agents’ access to national counterterrorism intelligence; the expertise of these
agents is called upon to ensure essential city infrastructure is protected from a potential
terrorist strike (Ervin, 2008). In New York City these interagency collaborations include:
Infragard, which is a program aimed at infrastructure protection and includes officials
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the New York Police Department
(NYPD); Shield Program, an association of police officials and private sector agencies to
help protect critical assets; and finally the Joint Terrorism Task Force, a program
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overseen by the U.S. Department of Justice that teams local police departments with FBI
specialists. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has Operation Archangel which
is identical to the NYPD’s Shield Program, and Los Angeles also has the Homeland
Security Advisory Council which coordinates over 300 private security experts with
LAPD officers with counterterrorism expertise.
The flow of intelligence between public and private allows for improved building
standards, rating systems and guidelines which trickle down from a federal level to local.
Urban planners and local authorities are increasingly requiring anti-terrorism measures as
part of private building permit applications. As a result, private security officials,
architects and designers are now called upon to design new security measures to
buildings and public spaces. Security planning is starting to become normalized in
everyday building activities, and many professionals are allowing the systematic target
hardening of key urban assets as concerns move away from public to private entities and
prioritizing law enforcement and security concerns (Marcuse, 2004). These fortifications
can lead to a separation of those who are “security cleared” from those who are
considered risky, and feed into a culture of fear (Ellin, 1996). With public spaces being
fortified, cities now have elites that cut themselves off within fortified bunkers and
government coalitions that work to create new systems of securitization within urban life
(Graham, 2010).
To combat urban terrorism, governments have focused more on collaboration than
on intervention (Coaffee et al., 2009). Security decision making is being shifted from the
national to local level, as well as from public to private entities with the creations of
consortiums and intelligence sharing programs. As urban security policy moves away
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from federal guidelines, Bugliarello (2005) argues the general public will be more
accepting of such security implementations.
Risks of Security Zones and Urban Fortification
When sociologists such as Jane Jacobs, C. Ray Jeffery, and Oscar Newman began
to develop design principles that would prevent crime, their ideas received a large amount
of criticism. Fortified architecture was perceived as oppressive and gave an appearance
of a prison like atmosphere (Katyal, 2002). However, with advances in design concrete
can be modified to enhance visibility, access barriers can be aesthetically pleasing; and
plastics can be utilized that appear to be welcoming, but are actually stronger than most
metals.
Architecture can serve as a regulatory force (Katyal, 2002). Structural design can
be substituted or used in combination with customary governing mechanisms like laws or
social norms (Shah and Kesan, 2007). The question remains as to how security
zones/urban fortification can influence and affect human behavior. The influence can be
minimal by encouraging communication through the placement of certain objects within
the interior of buildings. At the opposite side of the spectrum, movement can be
restricted and people’s ability to interact with others can be curtailed.
Public space is structured to encourage or discourage social interactions (Shah
and Kesan, 2007). For example, Osmond (1957) showed that hallways generally
discouraged social interactions, while circular rooms encouraged communication. Much
like Poyner’s previously mentioned argument for controlling all facets of space, the
design of buildings can effectively dominate and control people in an orderly fashion
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(Shah and Kesan, 2007). Foucault (1979) highlighted the importance of surveillance in
penalizing people.
Foucault’s research, based upon Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, found a prisoner
in a panopticon would feel as if they are always being watched. A panopticon is a
cylindrical wall of prison towers surrounding a central tower. The tower allows for a
guard to observe inmates without them knowing if and when they are being watched.
Out of fear, the panopticon would maintain order over numerous inmates through
surveillance (Markus, 1993). Foucault (1979) found that the architectural setup of the
panopticon disciplined its subjects through surveillance.
Video surveillance of urban public space is also a potential risk of security zone
implantation. Davis (1990) argues that CCTV cameras linked to police stations cause
urban dwellers to feel less safe due to the social perception of a potential threat. Prior to
September 11th, only 13 city police departments in the U.S. were utilizing CCTV
surveillance cameras to monitor urban public spaces. In the months after September 11th,
25 city police departments were actively using CCTV cameras (Nieto, Johnston-Dodds,
and Simmons, 2002). The increase of CCTV cameras in major US cities since the
September 11th attacks is cause for concern and raises issues with privacy and public
uneasiness. Although little research has been conducted on police surveillance and
CCTV cameras in the U.S., research in the United Kingdom has shown a racial bias in
police officers CCTV monitoring of citizens (Norris and Armstrong, 1997). Norris and
Armstrong (1997) found: black people were 1.5 to 2.5 times more likely to be surveilled
than a white person, and 30% of targeted surveillances on black people were prolonged,
lasting nine minutes or more, compared to 10% with white people.
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Fyfe and Bannister (1998) demonstrated how surveillance of citizens has proven
mostly unsuccessful in major cities; that is crime rates in surveilled areas have decreased
only to have crime displaced to other locations. Bianchini (1990) states the use of CCTV
cameras leads to the disenfranchisement of citizens who do not conform to the perceived
social norm of a well regulated public space. As CCTV surveillance continues to show
signs of excluding certain individuals, it curtails the notion of the city being an open and
accessible form of space (Fyfe and Bannister, 1998; Walzer, 1986). Further research in
the area may be needed with the dramatic increase in CCTV video surveillance after the
September 11th terrorist attacks.
With the continuous threat of urban terrorism, many cities have regularly planned
for terrorist strikes with advanced security design features that are constantly being
updated (Coaffee and Rodgers, 2008; Haynes, 1995; Hoffman, 1998). Studies have
shown that if a public urban space is susceptible or perceived by the community to be at
risk from a terrorist attack, there is a reduction in business confidence and an increase in
public anxiety (Brown, 1985; Compton, Murray, and Osborne, 1980; Jarman 1993). The
constant fortification of space can lead to businesses relocating from the threatened area
as well as the unwillingness of citizens to visit certain parts of the city. During the
Provisional Irish Republican Army’s bombing campaign of the late 1970s and early
1980s, businesses were in favor of high levels of security to ease public concerns over
safety (Brown, 1985). Brown (1985) also found that terrorism did increase fears for
public safety, which lead to the increased fortification of the city of Belfast.
Since the 1960s, terrorists have particularly targeted military organizations,
government buildings, elected leaders, and particular racial or ethnic groups (Rees,
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2006). However, during the 1990s the tendency of terrorists shifted towards economic
targets, with the main purpose of creating economic disruption, social nervousness, and
applying political stress on governments (Coaffee, 2000). Terrorist targeting began to be
focused against business districts, transportation networks, or critical infrastructure
(Coaffee, 2009). Important financial centers became desirable targets because of their
cosmopolitan workforce, devastating side effects of economic disruption, and mass media
coverage and publicity of targeting such a building (Coaffee, 2009). Such economic
targets include: the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks, 1993 Bombay attacks,
2005 London Attacks, 2007 Yazidi community bombings, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Terrorism over the last fifteen years has had a huge effect upon the contemporary
urban landscape in areas perceived to be at risk (Savitch, 2008; Coafee, 2009). Coaffee
(2009) notes with the Provisional Irish Republic Army bombings of Belfast, which
eventually lead to the creation of a “ring of steel” surrounding the city, there was a
profound influence on the look of the city, the way occupants utilized the space, and how
they felt about being present within the fortified walls.
Putting all of this together, the overall impact security zones have on the urban
landscape is realized. The city landscape is fortified and placed in a state of perpetual
vigilance in response to a perceived threat that may never arrive. Access to the city has
now become restricted, and residents and visitors are no longer able to freely explore the
landscape. Citizens are filtered through spaces in order to ensure the desired individual is
occupying the correct space. Once beautiful architecture is now littered with CCTV
cameras, bollards, and crash rated planters. Social and public activities are increasingly
becoming privatized. The rich, living in citadels, or gated buildings which provide
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private security, restaurants, gyms, transportation, and entertainment, become
increasingly segregated from the poor.
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CHAPTER FOUR
METHODOLOGY
Methodology of Identifying and Analyzing Fortified Urban Space
Critics and researchers both address the issue of a decaying public realm in
present day cities, but few empirically assess the extent of the fortification of the urban
landscape in public spaces. And some critics assume that anti-terror measures employed
around high-profile targets creates a “landscape of fear” (Sorkin, 2004). No researchers
attempt to conceptualize the “district-wide security apparatus,” instead they provide
limited analyses of individual and iconic spaces (Miller, 2007). If different fortification
measures produce varying visual, perceptional and representational meanings it is
paramount to empirically study the fortification of our cities.
To better understand the emerging phenomena of security zones and fortifying
urban public space, this dissertation will examine security zones located in the civic and
financial business districts in three U.S. cities: Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis.
According to the 2010 Census, Chicago ranks as the third most populated city in the
United States, while Indianapolis comes in at twelve and Detroit at eighteen. Major
global cities such as London and New York, having all experienced terrorist attacks, are
recognized as the standard of interagency collaboration and proactive planning against
terrorist attacks (Ervin, 2008). However, there is virtually nothing written about recent
security policies or changing urban space in Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis.
Nemeth (2010) studied the location and intensity of security zones located in New
York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. This study provided a glimpse as to what security
zones look like and where they manifest themselves. However, there were several
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oversights in Nemeth’s study as well as intriguing questions that need to be answered.
First, Nemeth only examined Tier I cities and ignored Tier II cities. New York, Los
Angeles and San Francisco were three of the top five cities to receive the most funding
from the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative from 2002
through 2012 (Coburn, 2012). Research is needed to compare Tier I cities security
landscape to Tier II cities.
Although Nemeth’s research did identify security zones present in New York, Los
Angeles, and San Francisco, he did not identify the zones influence on surrounding urban
public space. Using an inverse distance weight interpolation on the security zone
phenomena allows for a true representation and displays the overall invasive nature of
security zones in urban public space. Nemeth also compared security zones against civic
and financial districts. For this research, civic and financial districts were fused together
for a more realistic sense of security zones in the urban core of the selected cities.
Nemeth’s study also analyzed several policy variables that were not included in
this study. Nemeth’s policy findings suggested security zones were the most intense
when it was controlled by federal and local policies. For this study, the policy variables
were removed and replaced with a category of determining if the building was either
publicly owned (city, county, and federal) or privately owned to determine if security
zones were more intense in these types of buildings.
For the surveillance criteria, Nemeth chose not to include CCTV cameras. In a
previous study, Nemeth (2009) estimates 95% of buildings in midtown Manhattan to
have some type of CCTV camera surveillance present. With prior research suggesting a
racial bias in police surveillance of citizens (Norris and Armstong, 1997) and Foucault’s
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(1979) study establishing that surveillance can be used as a form as punishment, it would
seem the inclusion of CCTV video surveillance cameras would be a necessity for such a
study. For these reasons, CCTVs were included in the surveillance category for this
study.
Once the intensity and spatial extent of the urban security zones are identified,
this study will then compare the effects on social and commercial activity within the
identified security zones to areas outside of the identified security zones. The social and
commercial activity data used for this study will be population rates, crime rates, and
office space rental rates from 2000 through 2010. Crime rates will consist of crimes
against persons and crimes against property. Crimes against persons will include:
robbery, battery, assault, homicide, and criminal sexual assault. Crimes against property
comprises of: theft, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson. This dissertation provides a
visual representation of the security zone extent and intensity in these cities, and it will
also offer an explanation of the impact security zones have on commercial and social
activities within the sample areas.
This dissertation will add to existing literature on security and public space and
also expand upon Sampson’s definition of social mechanisms to include anti-terrorism
security zones appearing in response to the threat of terrorism. The study will quantify
the loss and or fortification of public space and measure the intensity of these spaces in
three major U.S. cities. While previous studies have described the spatial impacts of antiterror security, none have conducted empirical assessments outside of global cities like
New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009), Washington D.C. (Benton-Short,
2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008). This analysis will measure the spatial extent and
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intensity of security zones in urban space and determine whether cities with substantially
smaller population and density numbers (Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit) have
fortified buildings, areas, and neighborhoods; and also restrict or close off public space in
their civic and financial districts, similar to larger global cities such as New York,
London, and Madrid.
Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis have been selected for numerous reasons. First,
each city is listed in the Department of Homeland Security’s 2010 Urban Area Security
Initiative List. The United States Department of Homeland Security have identified these
cities as high risk targets for future terrorist strikes and receive federal funding in
response to this threat.

The DHS considers Chicago to be a Tier I urban area due to its

high population density and high risk for threats (DHS, 2010). An analysis of this type of
city is likely to expose fortification measures at their most extreme. Detroit and
Indianapolis are considered Tier II cities. These cities were selected in order to
determine the level of security differences between Tier I and II type cities.
Second, it is informative to analyze both civic and financial districts in cities other
than New York, London, etc., if there is to be a better understanding whether security
measures differ in relation to the size and population density of cities. Therefore, this
dissertation will examine fortified spaces within both civic center districts, which are
comprised mainly of public buildings and governmental structures, and financial business
districts which encompass major banks and other financial institutions. The
concentration of high-profile corporate headquarters and governmental buildings make
these areas prime targets for high profile terrorist attacks (Savitch, 2008). Although more
iconic public spaces can be found outside these districts, studying these districts offers a
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more in-depth understanding of whether significant physical or regulatory differences
occur within these districts, and or around public or private buildings.
Finally, the districts studied within each city, differ in population, density, size,
and geographic location. Each city offers a very different expression of public space.
This study considers public space to be: publicly or privately owned exterior space
legally required to allow public access, including all plazas, parks, sidewalks, and
pedestrian streets where motorized traffic is forbidden. Privately owned spaces, such as
corporate plazas, are still publicly accessible, but might present different obstacles or
prioritize use for employees over the general public.
For the purpose of this dissertation, the presence and intensity of security zones
will be analyzed in the civic center and financial district neighborhoods of three cities:
Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis. A security landscape is the aggregate geography of
individual security zones in a certain geographic location. A security zone is a restricted
area located around a public or private building that has a combination of access
restrictions, behavioral controls, or other security measures. These individual zones
embody a security landscape and can be located on either public or private property and
enforced and managed by private developers and property managers or governmental
entities.
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Chicago

Figure 3: Chicago Central Loop
The first site selected was the central loop in the City of Chicago. The central
loop is located within Chicago’s Loop neighborhood which is also considered the central
business district for Chicago. The central loop contains the commercial center as well as
all major governmental entities in the City of Chicago. The city of Chicago is considered
a Tier I city by the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas Security Initiative
and has received $477,545,452 in federal funding from 2003 through 2012 to combat
terrorism (Coburn, 2012). The boundaries of the central loop are West Wacker Drive and
East Van Buren Street for north and south; and State Street and Wells Street for east and
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west. The boundaries were taken from the City of Chicago’s official website. The
population of the sample area was obtained by adding up Census block level population
numbers from the 2010 Census. The exact 2010 population the central Loop is 2,044 (IL
Cook County - Census Tract 8391, Block Group 1). The area being examined is 0.219
square miles; 137.272 acres; and 6,031,486.895 square feet.
Indianapolis

Figure 4: Downtown Indianapolis (Central Business District)
The second area selected was downtown Indianapolis’ Central Business District.
The boundaries are taken from the Indianapolis Regional Center Plan 2020 report. The
Indianapolis Regional Center Plan 2020 was prepared by the City of Indianapolis, the
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Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee, Indianapolis Downtown INC., and Ball State
University’s College of Architecture and Planning. The boundaries are Michigan Street
to Maryland Street for north and south; and North Delaware Street to Capitol Avenue for
east and west. Indianapolis is considered a Tier II city on the Urban Areas Security
Initiative and has received $50,774,706 in federal funding, from 2003 through 2012, to
combat terrorist activities (Coburn, 2012). The exact population of the sample area is
581 (IN - Marion County - Census Tract 3910, block group 3). The area being examined
is 0.226 square miles; 142.357 acres; and 6,363,793.282 square feet.
Detroit

Figure 5: Downtown Detroit
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The third area examined will be Downtown Detroit. Downtown Detroit contains
a designated central business district. The boundaries were defined from the National
Register of Historic Places listing in Downtown and Midtown Detroit. The boundaries
are Michigan Avenue and Monroe Street for north and Jefferson Avenue for south.
Randolph Street and Washington Boulevard are the boundaries for east and west. The
City of Detroit is also considered a Tier II city and has received $132,614,497 in federal
funding from 2003 through 2012 (Coburn, 2012). The exact population for the sample
area is 303 (MI - Wayne County - Census Tract 5208, Block Group 1 and Census Tract
5172, Block Group 1). The area for Downtown Detroit is 0.103 square miles; 64.46
acres; and 2,834,124.051 square feet.
Collection of Data
Because the level of security zone restrictions vary from zone to zone, a simple
and objective set of criteria is used to distinguish methods and classify security zones and
security landscapes based on their overall level of restriction and or the presence and
intensity of certain benchmarks (see Table 2). Access restrictions will include: bollards,
Jersey barriers, gates, or fences located at entrance and exit points to a space or building.
Behavioral controls include posted signs prohibiting activities like photography or
loitering, or physical features that discourage sitting or gathering in small or large groups.
Surveillance measures will include security guards/police officers and other human
surveillance. Closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras are also included under
surveillance. Zone level data on seven descriptive variables (see Table 1) will be
collected.
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Table 1. Security zone analysis variables
Variable name Description of variable Type of variable
Tier
Tier type of city
Dichotomous

Control (Total)

Total score of
security zone
classification
criteria
(Behavior +
surveillance +
access)
Behavior score of
security
classification
criteria

Ordinal

Control
(Surveillance)

Surveillance score
of security
classification
criteria

Ordinal

Control
(Access)

Access score of
security
classification
criteria

Ordinal

Building
owner

Ownership of
building at which
security zone is
located
Permanence of
physical barriers
found within zone

Dichotomous

Control
(Behavior)

Duration

Ordinal

Dichotomous

Coding
0 = Tier I urban
area
1 = Tier II urban
area
1-2 = Low
security
3-4 = Moderate
security
5-6 = High
security
0 = No restriction
1 = Minor
restriction
2 = Major
restriction
0 = No restriction
1 = Minor
restriction
2 = Major
restriction
0 = No restriction
1 = Minor
restriction
2 = Major
restriction
0 = Public
1 = Private
0 = Temporary
1 = Permanent
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Table 2. Classification and criteria for security zone control variables.

Control
(Behavior)

No restriction
(0 = Points)
Behavior
unrestricted

Minor restrictions
(1 = Point)
Behavior reduced by
either physical or
legal restrictions

Control
(Surveillance)

No security
personnel or
CCTV present

CCTV or one
security guard
present

Control
(Access)

No physical
obstructions to
access

Few physical
obstructions to
access, but no
entrances blocked

Figure 6: Access restriction

Major restrictions
(2 = points)
Behavior reduced
by both physical
and legal
restrictions
CCTVs and one or
more security
guards present
Several physical
obstructions to
access and/or
entrances that are
blocked

Figure 7: Behavioral control

Figure 8: Surveillance measure
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The classification criterion is a modified version of Nemeth’s (2010) zone level
data table and aligns with Robert Sampson’s ecometric method of observing behavioral
settings, especially at the neighborhood level. Nemeth employs a simplified version of
Flusty’s (1994) interdictory space classification system which only focuses on three
typologies: access restrictions, behavioral controls, and surveillance measures. Each
zone is assessed on the following three criteria: one point will be received for any minor
restriction and two points for any major restriction. The total scores range from 0 to 6
points. The zones have been grouped into three categories based on an overall restriction
level: low (0-2), moderate (3-4), or high (5-6). For example, if a building were to be
equipped with a CCTV camera and have a visible security guard the building would
receive a score of 2 in the Surveillance category. If the building were also to have
signage warning of loitering and have no designated area for the public to converse (e.g.
lack of city benches) the building would receive a score of 2. If the same building were
to have bollards surrounding the perimeter, the building would receive a score of 1 in the
access category. If the building were to have bollards as well as having only one access
point to the building the score would be 2. This scoring system allowed for comparisons
of intensity across zones. This researcher must acknowledge that certain criteria might
have been weighted, or included additional measures or restrictions, however the
simplicity of the tool allows for future replication of this methodology which could be
used for future cross-sectional or longitudinal analyses.
Each city was observed over a period of several days at a time to collect crosssectional systematic social observation data on each security zone. Each city’s central
business district was observed over a course of several days to geotag the dimensions of
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each security zone as well as ascertain and document the intensity of each security zone.
While in the field a Casio Exilim H20G hybrid GPS digital camera was employed to
define the boundaries of the security zone. Observed data was collected with a notepad
and later typed into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. Identifiable security zones were
photographed with the GPS camera which was embedded with global positional data.
The GPS camera was used to take a JPEG image that also contained metadata in
the form of an Exchangeable image file format (EXIF). The EXIF file contained latitude
and longitude information which could be read by multiple software programs, including
geographic information systems. The geotagged photographs will then be uploaded into
the geographic information systems program ArcGIS 10.1 and the geotagged photo will
be encoded to ArcGIS. High resolution photographs of each security zone will also be
collected. The security zone classification criteria will also be observed and coded for
spatial analysis in ArcGIS. The geotagged photographs will also be uploaded into
ArcGIS to allow for the creation of security zone polygons which allow for the spatial
calculation of the total area of each security zone polygon. ArcGIS Explorer will be
employed to help check for accuracy of the geotagged photos and measurements of the
security zone polygons.
Once the security zones have been identified within the ArcGIS program a spatial
analysis of the data was conducted. The spatial analyst tool of inverse distance weighted
(IDW) interpolation within the ArcGIS program estimates the intensity of the security
zones and neighboring space based on a known set of points. The geotagged photos of
security features construct a set of known data points for Chicago, Indianapolis, and
Detroit.
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IDW interpolation predicts a value for any unmeasured data point using values
from measured data points. This is done by calculating the set of known data points to
unknown data points with a weighted average of the values available at the known data
points. IDW interpolation weights the points closer to the prediction location more than
points farther away. Therefore, measured data points will have more influence on
predicted values closest to the known data point and diminish with distance. The most
accurate results from IDW interpolation are achieved when sampling is dense with
measured data points from the sample area. If the measured data points are sparse or
uneven, the results may not accurately represent the surface area (Watson and Philip,
1985). IDW Interpolation is commonly used for sampling precipitation, temperature,
evaluation, pollution sources, and mineral concentration. This dissertation is the first
time IDW interpolation is employed to measure the social phenomena of security zones.
IDW interpolation provides the spatial variation of the intensity of a security
surface for security zones/fortified space measures deployed to protect high value
terrorist targets within the each city’s core. ArcScene 10 was be used to provide highly
detailed security zone 3D surfaces of the IDW interpolation maps. This methodology can
be easily replicated and will allow for future researchers to engage in cross-sectional or
longitudinal analysis of Chicago, Indianapolis, Detroit or other cities.
Once the mapping of the security zones has been accomplished, crime rates,
office space rental rates, and population is compared from 2000 through 2010. This
comparison allows for a better understanding of the changes occurring within security
zones. The rates also are compared to similar rates outside of the security zone
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boundaries. This allows for a comparison of impacted areas to areas which are not
generally associated with security zones or urban fortification in general.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS
Introduction
This study uses geotagging and spatial analysis to conceptualize and quantify
security zones located within three major U.S. cities. Over the course of several days,
Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit were visited, and cross-sectional systematic social
observations on security zones and their intensity were collected. The sample area for
each city was located within the central business districts of each city. The intensity of
each security zone was also coded and documented. The dimensions of each security
zone were geotagged using a Casio Exilim H20G hybrid GPS digital camera. Observed
data was collected with a notepad and later typed into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.
Identifiable security zones were also photographed with the GPS camera which was
embedded with global positioning data. High resolution photographs of each security
zone were also collected. The GPS camera took JPEG image of the security zone that
contained metadata in the form of an Exchangeable image file format (EXIF). The EXIF
file contains latitude and longitude information which can be read by multiple software
programs, including geographic information systems, for a precise location of the
security zone.
The geotagged photographs were uploaded into the geographic information
systems program ArcGIS 10.1 and the geotagged photo, with the global positioning data,
was encoded to ArcGIS. Security zone classification criteria was also observed and
coded for in Microsoft Excel. The Excel spreadsheet was uploaded into ArcGIS as an
attribute table for spatial analysis of each geotagged point. The geotagged photographs
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were also uploaded into ArcGIS to allow for the creation of security zone polygons.
These photos allowed for the spatial creation and calculation of the total area of each
security zone polygon. ArcGIS Explorer, a companion program, was employed to cross
reference accuracy of the geotagged photos and measurements of the security zone
polygons.
The spatial analyst tool of inverse distance weighted (IDW) interpolation, a
feature of the ArcGIS program, was used to measure for the intensity of the security
zones and neighboring space. The geotagged photos of security features construct the set
of known data points for Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit. IDW interpolation predicts
a value for any unmeasured data points using values from measured data points. This is
done by calculating the set of known data points to unknown data points with a weighted
average of the values available at the known data points.
IDW interpolation weights the points closer to the prediction location more than
points farther away. Therefore, measured data points will have more influence on
predicted values closest to the known data point and diminish with distance. IDW
interpolation provides an observable intensity of a security surface for security zones
space measures deployed to protect high value terrorist targets within each city’s core.
ArcScene 10 was used to provide highly detailed security zone surfaces of the IDW
interpolation maps.
With the intensity and extent of the security zones identified, this study will then
compare social and commercial activity within the identified central business districts to
areas outside of the identified security zone areas. The social and commercial activity
data used for this study will be population rates, crime rates, and office space rental rates

84

from 2000 through 2010. This will offer an explanation of security zone influences over
commercial and social activities within security zones.
Chicago
The first site sampled was the City of Chicago. As of 2011, Chicago is home to
2,703,713 residents. Chicago’s economy is mainly based on manufacturing, printing and
publishing, finance, and food processing. The city is also a major transportation and
distribution center due to O’Hare International Airport and the Port of Chicago. Chicago
is also home to eleven Fortune 500 companies, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange,
Chicago Board of Trade, a Federal Reserve Bank, and over 230 government agencies.
Chicago is considered a Tier I city by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Urban Area Security Initiative list. The area selected for this study was the central Loop.
The central loop is located within Chicago’s designated Community Area 32, which is
also known as the “Loop.” The Loop is the central business district for Chicago. The
name is derived from cable car tracks making a large circle through the middle of the
city. After experiencing rapid growth during the Civil War, the Fire of 1871 completely
destroyed the Loop. The fire cleared the way for skyscrapers and the reorientation of the
business district from retail to commercial growth (Holt and Pacyga, 1979). The number
of people entering and leaving the Loop peaked at one million per day in the late 1940s
and began to decline with suburban development and the increased use of the automobile
(Holt and Pacyga, 1979). Presently, the city government and business leaders have
continued to produce a building boom to provide office space for corporations,
government agencies, and banks.
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The central loop contains the commercial center as well as all major governmental
entities in the City of Chicago. The boundaries of the central loop are West Wacker
Drive and East Van Buren Street for north and south; and State Street and Wells Street
for east and west. The boundaries were taken from the City of Chicago’s official
website. The total population is 2,044 (IL Cook County - Census Tract 8391, Block
Group 1). The area being examined is 0.216 square miles; 138.463 acres; and
6,031,486.895 square feet.
The following buildings were observed to have a detectable security zone:
Chicago Board of Trade, Ralph H. Metcalfe Federal Building, Everett M. Dirksen U.S.
Courthouse, John C. Kluczynski Federal Building, Burling Bank, BMO Harris Bank,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, First American Bank, Chase Tower, McDonald's,
BMO Harris Bank, Northern Trust Bank, 181 W. Madison, Fifth Third Bank, WBBMTV (CBS), Daley Civic Center, Cook County Building, 55. W. Wacker, and 205 W.
Wacker. The security features of each building were observed and cataloged. The
perimeter of each building and every security feature was geotagged for spatial
calculation by ArcGIS.
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BUILDING
Lakeside Bank & Chase Bank
Chicago Board of Trade
Chicago Mercantile Exchange Center (Offices)
77 W Jackson Blvd
77 W Jackson Blvd CCTV Camera
Security Booth (Dirksen Building)
Everett M. Dirksen U.S. Courthouse (Jackson & Plmouth)
Everett M. Dirksen U.S. Courthouse (Jackson & Dearborn)
Federal Protective Service Officers
John C. Kluczynski Federal Building (Jackson & Dearborn)
john C. Kluczynski Federal Building (Jackson & Federal)
Federal Protective Service Squad
141 W Jackson Blvd
BMO Harris Bank
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Truck Entrance
First American Bank
Chase Tower (Monroe & Dearborn)
Chase Tower (Monroe)
McDonald's
BMO Harris Bank
Northern Trust Bank (Monroe & Wells)
Northern Trust Bank (Wells)
181 W. Madison
Chase Tower (Madison)
Fifth Third Bank
WBBM-TV (CBS)
Daley Civic Center (Clark & Randolph)
Cook County Building (Sheriff, City Clerk, Ciy Council, etc.)
55. W. Wacker
205 W. Wacker

X
-9755226.741
-9755125.692
-9755014.329
-9755001.143
-9754987.966
-9754758.797
-9754794.992
-9754842.776
-9754841.188
-9754853.571
-9754906.911
-9754983.852
-9755132.284
-9755219.464
-9755244.864
-9755336.939
-9754821.794
-9754871.007
-9754963.082
-9754999.198
-9755138.501
-9755334.558
-9755337.336
-9755302.808
-9755004.357
-9754761.072
-9754855.529
-9755019.042
-9755184.671
-9754953.213
-9755323.895

Y
Behavior Surveillance Access
5142557.672
1
1
1
5142563.439
2
2
1
5142562.831
1
1
1
5142562.804
1
1
2
5142566.773
0
2
0
5142760.967
0
2
2
5142760.808
2
2
2
5142759.855
2
2
2
5142796.209
0
2
0
5142753.823
2
2
2
5142753.823
2
2
2
5142737.207
0
2
0
5142732.445
2
1
0
5142730.725
0
1
1
5142748.584
0
2
2
5142831.134
0
2
2
5143123.632
0
1
0
5143140.697
2
1
2
5143134.744
2
1
2
5143140.697
1
0
1
5143111.725
0
1
1
5143132.363
1
1
1
5143204.594
1
1
1
5143303.813
2
2
1
5143308.973
2
1
2
5143314.926
0
1
1
5143522.757
0
0
1
5143677.803
1
2
2
5143678.861
1
0
1
5144040.494
1
1
1
5144026.207
0
1
0

Total

Building Type
3
Bank
5
CME Group
3
CME Group Offices
4 Ralph H. Metcalfe Federal Building
2 Ralph H. Metcalfe Federal Building
4
Dirksen Fed Building
6
Dirksen Fed Building
6
Dirksen Fed Building
2
Dirksen Fed Building
6
Kluczynski Fed Building
6
Kluczynski Fed Building
2
Dirksen Fed Building
3
Burling Bank
2
Bank
4
Fed Reserve Bank
4
Fed Reserve Bank
1
Bank
5
Bank Headquarters
5
Bank Headquarters
2
Restaurant
2
Bank
3
Bank
3
Bank
5
Office Building
5
Bank Headquarters
2
Bank
1
T.V. Station
5
City and County Building
2
City and County Building
3
Office Building
1
Office Building

Table 3: Observed data for Chicago
Table 3 describes the observed data for the central loop of Chicago. The building
column lists the name or addresses of the building exhibiting defensible space measures.
X and Y contain the coordinate data of the defensible space measures on the Earth’s
surface. The X and Y coordinate data was collected by using a Casio Exilim H20G
hybrid GPS digital camera. Behavior, Surveillance, Access, and Total was the
observable data that was collected. Building Type serves as a brief description of the
building. The average score for buildings exhibiting security zone variables for the
behavior criteria was 1.25. Surveillance and access were 1.21 and 1.34, respectively.
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Figure 9 displays all of the identified buildings exhibiting security zones in
Chicago’s central Loop.

Each green box represents a building or cluster of buildings

displaying security zone characteristics in Chicago’s central Loop. When taking the
square footage of the central Loop and dividing it by the square footage of fortified
space; it was found that 22.6688% of the central Loop exhibited fortified space.
Several security zones stood out in the central Loop area. The first two were the
John Kluczynski Administrative Building and the Everett Dirksen Courthouse. Both of
these buildings are part of the Miles van der Rohe Chicago Federal Center. The Metcalfe
federal building and a U.S. post office are also located within the federal complex. Both
the Kluczynski and Dirksen buildings maxed out on the security zone criteria. The
Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) utilizes a basic three layers of
defense for site security. The “layers of defense” is a cumulative protection strategy
known as protection-in-depth and relies heavily on CPTED strategies for protecting and
hardening assets behind several barriers (FEMA, 2011). The Dirksen and Kluczynski
federal buildings apply all three layers of defense.
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Figure 9: Buildings exhibiting fortified space in Chicago
The first layer of defense usually consists of natural or manmade barriers at the
property line or sidewalk. Both federal buildings have their perimeter surrounded with
bollards, granite planters, and granite benches. The bollard system was installed in 2002
in response to increased security requirements for federal buildings.
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Figure 10: Bollards surrounding Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings

Figure 11: Bollards and planters surrounding Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings
The second layer of defense extends from the perimeter of the site to the exterior
side of a building. Both federal buildings have public seating and crash rated planters
within the plaza to provide inconspicuous barriers while allowing for public openness.
FEMA (2007) stresses public buildings must employ perimeter barriers and streetscape
enhancements while maintaining and augmenting the beautification of the public realm.
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Figure 12: Public seating also serving as a barrier
Another part of the second layer of defense is setbacks. According to FEMA
(2011), urban areas, particularly central business districts, are restricted in size because
the availability of building space and high cost of property which impacts security
designs. Most buildings in this study had a zero setback, meaning the buildings start
right on the property line. This makes the building more susceptible to extensive damage
from truck bombs containing chemical, biological, and radiological materials. Both the
Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings had significant setbacks from the city street.
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Figure 13: The plaza provides additional standoff distance for the buildings
Both the Dirksen and Kluczynski Federal Buildings had larges standoff distances.
The plaza was originally designed to serve as public communal space for farmers markets
and public gatherings (FEMA, 2007). The plaza also allows for a more effective second
layer of defense in an urban setting.
The third layer of protection is the building itself. Both the Dirksen and
Kluczynski federal buildings utilize pilotis, i.e. ground level support columns, to provide
further setback for
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Figure 14: Pilotis surround each building
potential attacks. All of these access restrictions attributed to these buildings scoring
high for the access variable.

Figure 15: Federal law enforcement SUV
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Figure 16: Security Booth

Figure 17: Armed patrols
The Dirksen and Kluczynski federal buildings also had multiple signage and
surveillance measures in place. A security booth with CCTV camera was located on the
perimeter of the Dirksen federal building. Several Department of Homeland Security
Federal Protective Service officers were patrolling the grounds at all times. Several of
their sport utility vehicles were parked around the Dirksen, Kluczynski and Metcalfe
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federal buildings. All three federal buildings had numerous CCTV cameras around the
perimeter of the buildings. These factors lead to both the Dirksen and Kluczynski federal
buildings to score high on the behavioral and surveillance variables as well. The
Metcalfe federal building scored just below the Dirksen and Kluczynski federal
buildings. For reference, the Everett McKinley Dirksen United States Courthouse houses
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, the U.S. Marshal Service, the
Federal Public Defender, and the U.S. Probation Service. Tenants of the John C.
Kluczynski Federal Building include: the Department of State Passport Agency,
Department of Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, Drug Enforcement Agency, Air
Force Recruiting Service, Office of Personnel Management, the Consumer Product
Safety Commission, General Services Administration, and offices for both U.S. senators
from Illinois.

Figure 18: Reserve bank vehicle entrance
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Figure 19: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago also stood out with an intense security zone
protecting the building. The building was surrounded with fixed bollards and crash rated
planters. The CCTVs were too numerous to count. The main vehicle entrance had a
rising wedge barrier accompanied by U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal
Protective Service officers. The building also had bars on all of the street level windows.
On a side note, after taking several pictures of the building perimeter, a Federal
Protective Service officer followed me for one city block and effectively chased me away
from the building.
Another location that stood out was Chase Tower. The building itself has an
interesting curving feature. The building has a wider base than at the top of the building.
The building site also includes a multi-terraced plaza on its south side. Although the
Chase Tower plaza was designed for public openness and hosts a wide variety of public
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Figure 20: Curved building form

Figure 21: Raised Planters

Figure 22: Chase Tower plaza
events, the plaza does exhibit a number of security zone features. First and foremost the
plaza provides a large setback distance for the building. Raised planters surround the
entire perimeter of the plaza as well. The multi-leveled plaza does not allow any vehicle
access to the southern side of the building. The shallow fountain at the bottom of the
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terrace is a perfect example of Boddy’s (2008) invisible security features. Boddy (2008)
describes these types of fountains as a passive aggressive design strategy; with the
fountain quietly discouraging public assembly. Planted trees, which can also be viewed
as a type of physical barrier, surrounded the perimeter of the plaza. On the north side of
Chase Tower, there is zero setback from the street to the building. Bollards have been
installed, on the north side of the building and partially on the east and west side, to

Figure 23: Bollards surrounding Chase Tower
prevent ramming by a motor vehicle. The north side also had several CCTV cameras
positioned throughout the perimeter.
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Next to Chase Tower was a McDonald’s. At first glance there is nothing notable
about the building. However, on closer inspection the building did exhibit several
security zone

Figure 24: Defensible space features surrounding McDonald’s
features. The first was the difficulty in moving around the building. There was only one
entrance and exit point and the building was surrounded by a giant low-rise planter on the
west side of the building and a five foot planter on the eastside. This McDonald’s is a
prime example of finding an appropriate balance between maintaining security while
preserving the public realm beautification. The balance was also identified and more
prevalent Indianapolis’ Central Business District.
The number of banks employing security zones within the central Loop was also
of interest. Burling Bank, Lakeside Bank, and two BMO Harris Bank’s all had common
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security zone features like bollards, CCTV cameras, security guards, and numerous
signage forbidding loitering and parking of vehicles.

Figure 25: BMO Harris Bank

Figure 27: Another BMO Harris Bank

Figure 26: Burling Bank

Figure 28: Lakeside Bank

An interesting note about Chicago was the staggering amount of CCTV cameras
present in the central Loop. The buildings that did have security zones in place almost all
had numerous CCTV cameras surrounding their perimeter. Further research found that
Chicago has been actively installing CCTV cameras throughout the city for the purpose
of terrorism prevention and crime control (Pastor, 2010). Chicago’s Crime Prevention
Information Center gathers intelligence from national, state, and local levels to deal with
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terrorist activities. A key component of the intelligence gathering is the CCTV camera
network within the City of Chicago. Interestingly enough, when there are lulls of
terrorist activities, the extensive CCTV camera network is utilized to combat street crime.
It was also found that Chicago is also instituting the Private Sector Video Domain
(PSVD) program which allows Chicago’s Office of Emergency Management personnel
to access private sector cameras to monitor for terrorist activities (Pastor, 2010).

Figure 29: One of many CCTV cameras located in the central Loop
However, in times where terrorism is not present the PSVD program is
incorporated into Chicago police communications systems. Pastor (2010) concludes
federal, state, and local law enforcement officers have access to over 2,000 public and
private CCTV cameras. For example, in 2003 Chicago police were observing a
suspiciously parked vehicle through a police observation device installed several weeks
prior. These observation devices are bulletproof and able to record a suspect from up to
150 feet away. While observing the suspect parked in his car the suspect began smoking
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marijuana. Shortly thereafter, members of Chicago’s Targeted Response Unit swarmed
in and arrested the suspect for a felony drug charge (Main, 2003).

Figure 30: Variation of Security Scores in the Central Loop (interpolated by IDW
method)
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Figure 30 displays the IDW interpolation data of the behavioral, access, and
surveillance variables in the central Loop of Chicago. The dark green areas have no
security zones present in that vicinity. The dark green to light green areas displays no
security zone or a low security zone presence. The yellow and orange areas exhibit
moderate security zones. Light red and dark red indicate intense security zones present in
that area. The score was measured from definable security zone criteria. The IDW
interpolation map displays that the security zone influence is regional and does not limit
itself to the perimeter of the building employing the security zone. Both the Dirksen and
Kluczynski federal buildings scored at the highest possible level and show up on the IDW
interpolation map as red. The plaza next to the Rohe Chicago Federal Center is displayed
on the map as a single green dot next to the red and orange areas. However, the
surrounding security zones quickly diminish the openness and lack of a security zone
within the plaza. Other intense security zones in the central Loop included: the Chicago
Board of Trade, the Daley Civic Center, and181 W. Madison Street (Paine Webber
Tower).
Figure 31 provides an overlay of identified security zone areas with the IDW
interpolation map. When a person enters a security zone they will have their access
restricted, behavior modified, or be surveilled. The degree to which this happens is based
on the intensity of the security zone. The more intense the security zone, the more likely
the person may feel the effects of the security zone.
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Figure 31: IDW interpolation map with fortified space in the central Loop
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Figure 32: Security surface of Chicago
Figure 32 is a thematic map created from raster data provided by the central Loop
IDW interpolation map. Raster data is a matrix of cells organized into rows and columns,
where each cell contains a value representing information. For this dataset the raster data
are the security zone criteria. This can be viewed as a temperature map for security zones
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within the central Loop of Chicago. The color ramp for this map is: green=low,
yellow=moderate and red=high. Simply put, the more red the map is, the more intense a
security zone; the more green the map, the security zones becomes less to nonexistent.
This image was accomplished by importing the IDW interpolation map into ArcScene, a
three dimensional visualization application that allows for GIS raster data to be view in
three dimensions.

Figure 33: Topographical security surface of Chicago
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Figure 33 provides a topographical security surface of the central Loop in
downtown Chicago. The more intense areas are displayed as a raised red mound. The
lower the security zone, the area descends and becomes green. This topographical map
was accomplished by importing the IDW interpolation map into ArcScene. ArcScene
was used to provide a vertical exaggeration of the security surface. Vertical exaggeration
is typically used to emphasize subtle terrain differences. However, the exaggeration was
applied to the IDW interpolation map allowing for high and low scoring security zones to
act as terrain and to represent a three dimensional surface map for display.
The buildings that have been identified as using security zone criteria correlate
with this topographical security surface map. The security zone being generated by the
Miles van der Rohe Chicago Federal Center can be seen at the lower right side of the
map. The three points in the vicinity of the Rohe Federal Center represent the
Department of Homeland Security Federal Protective Officers, a security booth, and
combination of bollards, planters, signage, and CCTV cameras surrounding a particular
area.
Figure 34 has the buildings in Chicago’s central Loop superimposed onto a 3D
prism map that was generated in ArcScene. Rather than their real elevations, the 3D
prism map displays the buildings total security score of the behavioral, access, and
surveillance variables.

107

Figure 34: Central Loop 3D prism map with fortified buildings
The buildings with less of a security presence have less height, while buildings
that manifested high levels of security are taller. The Dirksen and Kluczynski Federal
Buildings are the tallest buildings on Figure 34. The Metcalfe Federal Building, Chicago
Board of Trade, Chase Tower, 181 W. Madison, and the Daley Civic Center also

108

registered as taller buildings. WBBM-TV (CBS), 205 W. Wacker, and First American
Bank only score a one on the security zone criteria and the elevation of those buildings
reflect their low security score.

Figure 35: Central Loop 3D prism map - alternate image
Figure 35 reveals the central Loop security surface with the superimposed buildings at an
alternate angle. This angle provides a better view of the buildings exhibiting security
zones in the central Loop. Some buildings, such as 205 W. Wacker (located on the upper
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left side of the map) and WBBM-TV CBS (located on the middle right side of the map)
employed minimal security zones measures, but still register on the security surface map.
Indianapolis
The second city that was analyzed was Indianapolis. The Indianapolis economy
is primarily focused on industrial, commercial, and transportation. Tourism and sporting
events are also major economic factors. Indianapolis has aggressively quadrupled its
sporting and tourism trade during the 1980s. The 2011 population of Indianapolis is
833,024. The site chosen was Indianapolis’ central business district. The Department of
Homeland Security lists Indianapolis as a Tier II city. Although Tier II cities are at less
of a risk from a terrorist attack than Tier I cities, the Department of Homeland Security
still provides the city with significant funding to combat potential terrorist strikes.
Indianapolis’ central business district is located in downtown Indianapolis. It did
not become prominent until the Civil War. During the war, the U.S. Army placed 24
camps and an ammunition plant in Indianapolis. The city became a major wartime
location to launch campaigns against the Confederate States. Indianapolis also
experienced a post-war boom when business and industry reshaped the city. The central
business district, which also houses the Wholesale District, began to decline during the
Great Depression. During the 1970s and 1980s, the central business district was
aggressively revitalized. Aided by the creation of Unigov, the consolidation of city and
county government, the central business district has seen the addition of over 100 new
businesses and renovation projects since the mid 1990s (Discover Wholesale District,
2013).
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The boundaries of Indianapolis’ central business district are taken from the
Indianapolis Regional Center Plan 2020 report. The Indianapolis Regional Center Plan
2020 was prepared by the City of Indianapolis, the Greater Indianapolis Progress
Committee, Indianapolis Downtown INC., and Ball State University’s College of
Architecture and Planning. The boundaries are Michigan Street to Maryland Street for
north and south; and North Delaware Street to Capitol Avenue for east and west. The
population of the sample area is 581 (IN - Marion County - Census Tract 3910, block
group 3). The area being examined is 0.228 square miles; 146.092 acres; and
6,363,793.282 square feet.
BUILDING
575 N. Pennsylvania St.
575 N. Pennsylvania St.
1 Inidiana Square
1 Inidiana Square
200 E. Washington St.
141 E. Washington. St.
45 North Pennsylvania Street
107 North Pennsylvania Street
46 East Ohio Street
46 East Ohio Street
46 East Ohio Street
46 East Ohio Street

220 N. Meridian St.
220 N. Meridian St.
111 Monument Circle
111 Monument Circle
1 South Capitol Ave.
200 West Washington Street

201 N. Illinois Street
1 American Square
1 American Square
1 American Square

X
-9590827.813
-9590732.166
-9590725.763
-9590839.005
-9590647.446
-9590706.713
-9590830.728
-9590833.526
-9591040.528
-9590959.169
-9590949.247
-9590868.549
-9591154.977
-9591065.945
-9590984.332
-9590944.314
-9591301.401
-9591486.174
-9591246.892
-9591279.105
-9591447.645
-9591276.724

Y
Behavior Surveillance Access TotalBuilding Type
4833174.925
2
2
2
6 Minton-Capehart Federal Building: DEA, ICE, SSA, Dept. of VA, IRS, GSA
4833172.544
2
2
2
6 Minton-Capehart Federal Building (South Side)
4832571.859
2
0
1
3 Regions Bank Tower
4832575.034
2
0
1
3 Regions Bank Tower (Southwest Side)
4832236.367
2
2
1
5 Indianapolis City and County Building
4832125.27
1
0
1
2 Riley Bennett & Egloff, LLP. (Law Firm)
4832338.039
1
0
0
1 Huntington National Bank
4832362.522
1
0
0
1 The National Bank of Indianapolis
4832672.234
1
2
2
5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (West)
4832574.338
1
2
2
5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (South)
4832741.688
1
2
2
5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (North)
4832662.312
1
2
2
5 U.S. District Court - Southern District Indiana (East)
4832575.288
2
0
1
3 Indiana headquarters for AT&T (Southwest Side)
4832572.113
2
0
1
3 Indiana headquarters for AT&T (Southeast Side)
4832391.627
1
1
0
2 Chase Tower - Indiana headquarters for Chase Bank
4832365.83
1
1
1
3 Chase Tower - Southern Side
4831964.524
1
0
1
2 Hyatt Regency Indianapolis - PNC Center
4832364.27
2
0
0
2 Indiana Statehouse
4832750.477
1
1
1
3 Capital Center North Tower
4832584.88
1
1
0
2 OneAmerica Tower
4832590.701
1
0
1
2 OneAmerica Tower (Southwest Side)
4832744.689
1
0
1
2 OneAmerica Tower (Northeast Side)

Table 4: Observed data for Indianapolis

111

Table 4 features the observable security criteria for Indianapolis’ central business
district. The only building receiving a maximum score for the security zone criteria was
the Minton-Capehart Federal Building. The averages for buildings exhibiting security
zone criteria were as follows: behavior 0.95; surveillance 0.5; and access 0.5.

Figure 36: Fortified buildings in Indianapolis’ Central Business District
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Figure 36 displays the buildings with a detectable security zone. Three buildings
fell outside of the boundaries of the central business district, but were included in this
study due to the close proximity of the border. These are the Minton-Capehart Federal
Building, Indiana Statehouse, and Indianapolis City and County Building. The total
square footage observed has been adjusted from 6,363,793.282 square feet to
7,268,163.137 square feet to include the additional buildings. An analysis of the square
footage reveals that 25.2% of Indianapolis’ central business district displays some type of
security zone. The building that employed the most security zone features in
Indianapolis’ central business district was the Minton-Capehart Federal Building.
Maxing out on the security zone criteria, the Minton-Capehart Federal Building is a
prime example of Brutalist architecture.

Figure 37: Minton-Capehart Federal Building-West view
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Brutalist architecture is mainly characterized by features such as the use of raw
concrete, top-heavy massing, and the use of slender base supports (Whiteley, 2003). The
most notable features of the Minton-Capehart building are pilotis surrounding the entire
building as well as the inverted ziggurat form. In the late 1960s to the mid 1970s,
defensive architecture was used frequently as a result of research which indicated a
relationship between certain type of environmental design and reduced levels of violence
(Coaffee, 2009). The Minton-Capehart Federal Building, constructed in 1976, appears to
be a product of defensive architecture.
This building exhibited raised planters surrounding the west side of the building
and half of the north and south side of the building. The remaining north, south, and east
perimeter of the building was protected with a ten foot high concrete wall which
protected the employee parking lot. The building and parking lot occupy the entire city
block. There is also a noticeable setback from the city street. Due to the limited access
points of the building and other defensible space features, a maximum score was giving
for the access variable. Two security booths and numerous CCTV cameras were present
on the north and south side of the buildings perimeter.
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Figure 38: Minton-Capehart-South view

Figure 39: Minton-Capehart-Security wall

Figure 38 and 39 shows the concrete wall surrounding over half of the building.
Department of Homeland Security Protective Service officers were also present
throughout the perimeter of the building. These factors contributed to the maximum
scores of surveillance. The building, which is open to the public, had few areas for the
public to sit down and congregate. The lack of public seating, benches and chairs, was
noticeable. It almost seemed as if the lack of seating was by design. Perhaps building
administrators do not want people loitering around the open spaces of the building. This
building received a maximum score in behavioral due to the lack of public openness.
Tenants of the Minton-Capehart Federal Building include: General Services
Administration, Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Drug
Enforcement Agency.
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Figure 40: U.S. Courthouse-east view

Figure 41: U.S. Courthouse-southeastern view

Another federal building scoring high on the security zone criteria is the Birch
Bayh Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse. The building had an above average setback
and was surrounded by large marble walls. Several CCTV cameras were present on
every side of the building. The building had numerous access restrictions and only
allowed for public gatherings in front of the building which has several benches. The
Birch Bayh Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse houses the U.S. District Court of
Southern Indiana, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, U.S. Attorney office, U.S. Marshal Service,
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

Figure 42: One American Square

Figure 43: Foliage surrounding One America
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One American Square (Figure 42 and 43) although scoring low on the security
zone criteria, provides a great example of passive aggressive urban security design.
Instead of using fixed bollards and crashed rated planters, the whole building is
surrounded with a slope with strategically planted trees. The trees seemed varied, but it
was noticeable that a car would not be able to drive past the tree barriers. The vegetation
also acts as bollards and provides a noticeable setback from the sidewalk. Pleasant
vegetation aside, One American Square did still have CCTVs and had no seating or
congregating points for pedestrians. The perimeter appears to be designed to keep
pedestrian traffic moving and prevent loitering. According to Boddy (2008), One
American Square’s passive aggressive security design will be the norm for future central
business district buildings.

Figure 44: PNC Center
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The Hyatt Regency Indianapolis/PNC Center, Figure 44, is another building
exhibiting a low level security zone. However, there are some interesting features worth
noting. The PNC center is a mixed use building which houses the 500 room Hyatt
Regency as well as commercial offices. The building has defensive foliage and crash
rated planters surrounding the building. The building has a large setback on its southern
side. The PNC Center was the only hotel in this study to display a security zone.
Figure 45 is the IDW interpolation map of the central business for Indianapolis.
The most noticeable results are the extreme values being generated by the MintonCapehart federal building in the upper right corner of the map. The security zone is
extending far beyond the perimeter of the building. A possible reason for this outlier is
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Figure 45: Variation of Security Scores in Downtown Indianapolis (interpolated by IDW
method)
the lack of sampled data points that were used to interpolate the Minton-Capehart Federal
Building’s security surface. There may not be enough sampled points to accurately
predict the extent of the security zone. Extending the sample area far beyond the central
business district will provide a more accurate representation of the Minton-Capehart and
confirm that the initial sample is an outlier. The U.S. District Courthouse also shares an
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intense security zone which can be seen underneath the Minton-Capehart security zone.
The final security zone registering a high value was the Indianapolis City and County
Building located on the lower right side of the IDW interpolation map.

Figure 46: IDW interpolation map with fortified space for Indianapolis
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Figure 46 provides the perimeter of the buildings with security zones in effect.
Again the most significant finding in this IDW interpolation map is the Minton-Capehart
security zone outlier extending far beyond the physical location of the building.

Figure 47: Security surface of Indianapolis
Figure 47 is a thematic map of security zones within Indianapolis’ central
business district. This security surface provides a better representation of the security
zone being generated by the Minton-Capehart Federal Buildings as well as the Birch
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Bayh Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse. The Minton-Capehart security zone extends
several blocks from the buildings origination point. The map provides a sense of the
severe intensity of the security zone. The majority of the central business district
exhibited little to no security zones.

Figure 48: Topographical security surface of Indianapolis
Figure 48 presents a three dimensional security surface of the central business
district of Indianapolis. The more intense areas are displayed as a raised red mound.
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The lower the security zone, the area descends and becomes green. The main buildings
with intense security

Figure 49: Indianapolis security surface with defensible space buildings
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zones were the Minton-Capehart Federal Building, Birch Bayh U.S. Courthouse and the
Indianapolis City and County Building. For Indianapolis, the only buildings that have
very high security zones are government entities.

Figure 50: Indianapolis security surface with defensible space buildings-alternate image
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Figure 49 has the thematic map superimposed with the intensity level that each
building displayed for the observable security zone criteria. With the Minton-Capehart
Federal Building
appearing on the thematic map its, security zone is so intense that it extends into other
security zones several blocks away. Compare the Minton-Capehart security zone, which
had a total value of six, to the security zone being generated by the Indianapolis City and
County Building, with a total value of five. The City and County Building’s security
zone does not extend outward for several city blocks like the Minton-Capehart building.
The thematic map being generated by ArcScene concludes the security features being
used by the Minton-Capehart building are much more extreme than any other detectable
security zone. Figure 50 provides a better comparison of security zones between the
massive Minton-Capehart building and the City and County building.
Detroit
Detroit’s economy is primarily based upon the automotive industry. With the
decline of the automotive manufacturing, the city lost 39% of manufacturing jobs in the
1980s. The automotive supply industry is also a huge economic factor in Detroit.
General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, and Daimler AG (formerly Chrysler)
are all headquartered in Detroit. Detroit is the 18th most populated city in the U.S. and
the population has been steadily declining for over 60 years. The population of Detroit
during 1950 was 1,849,569; in 1980 it is 1,203,339; 2000 was 951,270; to its 2011
population of 713,239. Detroit is currently operating on a $300 million budget deficit
and is in the process of having the state of Michigan appoint a manager to manage
Detroit’s financial woes. In 2011, Detroit ranked third in murder only behind New York
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and Chicago. The population of the sample area is 303 (MI - Wayne County - Census
Tract 5172, Block Group 1 and Census Tract 5172, Block Group 1).
Detroit is considered a Tier II city by the Department of Homeland Security. The
boundaries were defined from the National Register of Historic Places listing in
Downtown and Midtown Detroit. The boundaries are Michigan Avenue and Monroe
Street for north and Jefferson Avenue for south. Randolph Street and Washington
Boulevard are the boundaries for east and west. The area for Downtown Detroit is 0.101
square miles; 65.062 acres; and 2,834,124.051 square feet.
Detroit was originally a trading post for Native American tribes. During the Civil
War, Detroit was the final stop of the Underground Railroad. In 1896, Detroit became
the Motor City of the world with Henry Ford’s inception of the assembly line. Detroit’s
manufacturing success continued through post World War II. With the decline of the
U.S. automotive industry Detroit has suffered the most with white flight and increased
crime rates. However, the city is actively engaged in multiple revitalization projects.
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BUILDING
2 Woodward Avenue
600 Randolph Street
611 Woodward Avenue
511 Woodward Avenue
1 Woodward Avenue
535 Griswold Street
719 Griswold Street
231 West Lafayette Boulevard
160 W. Fort Street
625 Shelby Street
205 West Congress
2 Washington Blvd
250 W. Larned Street
211 West Fort Street
500 Griswold Street

X
-9244388.446
-9244323.358
-9244663.428
-9244606.807
-9244558.706
-9244714.228
-9244842.657
-9245037.92
-9244925.207
-9244908.549
-9244870.661
-9244834.254
-9244898.812
-9245017.346
-9244687.24

Y Behavior Surveil ance Access Total
Building Type
5210530.364
1
2
1 5 Coleman A. Young Municipal Center (City Hall)
5210825.64
2
1
1 4 Former Wayne County Building (Wayne Co. Courthouse)
5210597.092
1
1
1 3 The Qube (Formerly Chase Tower/Quickens Loans office building)
5210496.815
1
1
2 4 MFS Intelenet Inc. (Communication company)
5210343.568
1
2
1 5 Class A Office Center
5210487.555
0
2
0 2 Buhl Building (Class A Office Center)
5210672.075
0
1
0 1 Class A Office Center
5210590.054
1
2
1 4 Theodore Levin U.S. Courthouse
5210621.275
1
2
2 5 Office Space (Former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Detroit Branch Building)
5210465.996
0
1
1 2 Elysium Lounge (Night club)
5210404.19
0
1
2 3 Bankers Trust Company Building
5210227.659
1
0
1 2 Detroit Riverside Hotel (Closed)
5210272.321
1
1
2 4 City of Detroit Fire Department
5210489.703
1
2
1 4 Bankruptcy Court of the Eastern District of MI, U.S. Border Patrol HQ and US Attorneys office.
5210497.873
0
1
0 1 Guardian Building (Wayne County Government Center)
Table 5: Observed data for Detroit

Although Downtown Detroit is much smaller than the areas studied in Chicago
and Indianapolis, there were still a number of buildings employing security zones and
defensible space measures. The averages for buildings exhibiting security zone criteria
score in Downtown Detroit were as follows: behavior 0.73; surveillance 1.33; and access
1.06. Unlike Chicago and Indianapolis, no buildings observed maxed out on the total
security zone criteria. The former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Detroit Branch, 1
Woodward Avenue, and the Coleman A. Young Municipal Center scored the highest on
the security zone criteria.
One interesting note about Downtown Detroit was the noticeable multiple signage
indicating a central business district neighborhood watch program. Further research
found that the Detroit Police Department and more than 30 businesses in Downtown
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Detroit participate in a central business district neighborhood watch and patrol program
called “Project Lighthouse.” The neighborhood watch program, created in August 2011,
is designed to provide a safe environment for residents, employees, and visitors in the
Downtown Detroit area.

Figure 51: Project Lighthouse: CBD neighborhood watch program
The program provides information, aid, shelter, and safety for citizens in need of
assistance. Every participant, known as a lighthouse, has security personnel available 24
hours a day, seven days a week to assist citizens in need. The overall mission of Project
Lighthouse is to promote the safety and security of Downtown Detroit while augmenting
the Detroit Police Department’s presence in the central business district. Project
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Lighthouse is a prime example of blending public and private entities and interests; and
coordinating their efforts to provide urban security for Detroit’s central business district.
Three project lighthouse buildings fell within boundaries of this research project. Two of
the three buildings, The Qube (611 Woodward Avenue) and The Dime Building (719
Griswold Street), exhibited measurable defensible space measures. The third building,
First National Building (660 Woodward Avenue) had no detectable security zone
features.

Figure 52: Fortified buildings in Downtown Detroit
Figure 52 displays the buildings identified in Downtown Detroit that exhibited
some form of a security zone. One Building, the former Wayne County Building, did fall
outside of the boundaries of Downtown Detroit. However, the building was included in
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this study due to the close proximity of the border. The total square footage observed has
been adjusted from 2,834,124.051 square feet to 2,936,222.287 square feet to include the
additional building. An analysis of the square footage reveals that 26.7858% of
Downtown Detroit exhibits some form of security zone. The security zones that stood
out were the Coleman A. Young Municipal Center, 611 Woodward Avenue, 511
Woodward Avenue, and the former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Detroit Division.
The majority of buildings that had security zones were located on the western side of
Downtown Detroit.

Figure 53: Municipal Center

Figure 54: Spirit of Detroit

The Coleman A. Young Municipal Center contains the primary governmental
offices for the city of Detroit. The building had a large setback and many crash rated
planters throughout the perimeter of the building. All of the trash receptacles for the
building were located as far from the building site as possible. This can be explained as a
mitigation measure to reduce the likelihood of a bomb being placed in the trash
receptacle (FEMA, 2007). The intensity of these security zones features were noticeably
less than other government buildings in Chicago and Indianapolis. The security design
layout seemed to employ many of Boddy’s (2008) passive aggressive security design
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features. Another passive aggressive feature is the statue “Spirit of Detroit,” which is
located on the eastern side of the municipal center. The statue provides additional
setback and acts as a cleverly disguised barrier.

Figure 55: The Qube

Figure 56: Barrier free sign

The Qube, which is located at 611 Woodward Avenue, is a 14 floor office
building located in the heart of Downtown Detroit. The Qube is currently the
headquarters for Quicken Loans and was previously named Chase Tower. There were
numerous access restrictions for the west, east and part of the south side of the building.
The building appears to be built on a slope and the base of the building was lifted
approximately eight feet high to be even with the northern side of the building. This
build up of three-fourths of the building gives the building a fortress like appearance.
The barrier free entrance on Fort Street had a significant setback from the street. The
building also had a water drainage area on Fort Street, but was raised up two feet and
acted as if it were a large bollard. The building had one CCTV camera and no patrolling
security guards. Overall, the building was observed as having a moderate security zone.
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Figure 57: Former Federal Reserve Bank

Figure 58: Planters in front building
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The next building of interest was the former Federal Reserve Bank of ChicagoDetroit Branch building. The building was occupied by the Federal Reserve Bank until
2004. The building was vacant until 2011 when it was purchased by Quicken Loans for
additional office space. The building is surrounded with crash rated planters and
additional planters to provide further setback. CCTV cameras were also placed at the
entrance of the building. This building received a five for the security zone criteria.

Figure 59: 511 Woodward Avenue
One other interesting building exhibiting a number of security zone features was
511 Woodward Avenue. The building has an above average setback and is completely
surrounded by massive bollards. There was no place for public seating and only one
entrance hidden away on the side of the building. There appeared to be an entrance in the
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front of the building, but looks as if it had been barricaded shut. The building is
unmarked and CCTV cameras were also present around the building. 511 Woodward
Avenue’s tenant is MFS Intelenet Inc., a provider of communications services for
businesses and government agencies.

Figure 60: Variation of Security Scores in Downtown Detroit (interpolated by IDW
method)
Figure 60 display the IDW interpolation results for Downtown Detroit. The
buildings projecting intense security zones include the Coleman A. Young Municipal
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Center, 160 W. Fort St. (former Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago-Detroit Branch), and
the 1 Woodward Ave. (Michigan Consolidated Gas Building).

Figure 61: IDW interpolation map with buildings for Downtown Detroit
The Colman Center security zone, located on the lower right side in Figure 61,
does extend past its building perimeter. However, a portion of that area is considered
setback from the building. The remaining security zone overflow affects a public parking
garage across the street from the Coleman Center. The Michigan Consolidated Gas
Building, located in the lower middle portion of the map, had an intense security zone
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which only surrounded the main entrances of the building. The former Federal Reserve
Bank also had an intense security zone which was only found at is main entrance.

Figure 62: 3D prism map of Downtown Detroit
Figure 62 displays a 3D prism map of the security surface for Downtown Detroit.
The most intense security zones include: the Coleman municipal center can be seen in the
lower right side of the map; the Michigan Consolidated Gas Building security zone is
located in the lower middle section of the map; and the former Federal Reserve Bank
located in the left side of the map.
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Figure 63: Topographical security surface of Detroit
Figure 63 provides a topographical map of Downtown Detroit’s security surface.
Downtown Detroit did not present any buildings that had the maximum security zone
criteria. Therefore, the topography for Downtown Detroit is not as pronounced as
Chicago and Indianapolis.
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Figure 64: Detroit security surface with fortified buildings
The majority of buildings displaying security zone were located on the western
side of the observed area. The largest security zone, the Colman Municipal Center, can
be seen in the lower right corner of the map.
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Figure 65: Downtown Detroit security surface - alternate image
Figure 65 provides an alternative angle of Downtown Detroit’s security zones
with the buildings superimposed onto the map.
Summary and Discussion
Of all the federal building observed in this study, the Minton-Capehart Federal
Building had the most extreme security zone. As stated before, the Minton-Capehart
security zone could could be an outlier and further data points would need to be sampled
for a better approximation of the security field. The security zone extended much farther
than the security zones of the similarly scored Kluczynski and Dirksen Federal Buildings
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in Chicago. The Minton-Capehart building, originally constructed in 1976, has a
Brutalist architecture design which resembles a fortress like appearance. While the
Kluczynski, Dirksen, and Metcalfe Federal Buildings in Chicago have been retrofitted
with security zones in the wake of the September 11th attacks, the Minton-Capehart
building has been designed, intentionally or unintentionally, to restrict pedestrian
movement, limit access points for citizens, and provide maximum standoff distance in
case of a truck bomb.
The most frequently observed behavioral variable throughout this study was
prohibitive signage. These signs mainly prohibited public loitering in certain areas of the
building. For surveillance the CCTV camera was the most observed. FEMA (2011)
recommends the use of CCTV cameras as a low case and moderately effective means to
deter criminal activity. The bollard and crash rated planter were the most observed
access restriction. These defensive measures provide the greatest amount of protection to
the building and its inhabitants (FEMA, 2011).
Of the three districts observed, Chicago’s central loop had the most security zones
present. Seventeen buildings in the central Loop exhibited a security zone. Detroit and
Indianapolis had fifteen and thirteen buildings, respectively. Although the sample area
was less than half that of Chicago and Indianapolis, Detroit had more buildings than
Indianapolis exhibiting security zones and two less than Chicago. Detroit and
Indianapolis both had significant areas that did not have a security zone present. Taking
into account the possible outlier of Indianapolis’ Minton-Capehart Federal Building,
Indianapolis’ central business district had the least amounts of security zones present.
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Chicago’s security surface, which frequently had more security zones present, did not
have as many gaps as the other cities had present.
Even with the constant threat of another terrorist attack and U.S. cities adding
urban fortifications, of the observed cities, roughly three quarters of urban public space
appear to be free of security zones. Further research will be needed on other cities within
the U.S., but the pervasiveness of security zones appears to be primarily focused on
public buildings and private banks. The majority of security zone research has focused
on major global cities like New York and London, both of which have experienced
catastrophic terrorist attacks. In the case of London, they have been experiencing
terrorist attacks since the 1970s. Future studies should include cities that have
experienced a terrorist attack such as Oklahoma City and New York to compare the level
of security zones with cities that have not experienced such attacks.

141

CHAPTER SIX
ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
Introduction
This spatial analysis looked at three uniquely different cities. By adapting the
observable security zone criteria and imputing the data into ArcGIS and ArcScene, this
study has been able to display a phenomenon of public and private fortification of space
that is present in Downtown Detroit, Indianapolis’ central business district, and
Chicago’s central Loop. Each city varied widely in population density, overall size, and
economy. Each city also received a wide variance of federal funding from the
Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas Security Initiative. The averages of
behavior, surveillance, and access scores of Chicago, Indianapolis and Detroit are
presented in Table 6.
___________________________________________________________
Table 6. Security Zone Averages (Tier I vs. Tier II)
___________________________________________________________
City

Chicago
(Tier I)
Indianapolis
(Tier II)
Detroit
(Tier II)
Tier II
Averages
Tier I vs. Tier II
Mean
Differences

Behavior Average Surveillance Average

Access Average

1.25

1.21

1.34

0.95

0.50

0.50

0.73

1.33

1.06

0.84

0.915

0.78

0.41

0.295

0.56

The behavior average score for Chicago was 1.25, however the average scores of
the Tier II cites (Indianapolis and Detroit) are only 0.84, a difference of 0.41. The
surveillance average of Chicago was 1.21 with the Tier II averages at 0.915 a difference
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of 0.295. Access averages had an average of 1.34 for Chicago and 0.78 for the Tier II
cities a difference of 0.56. In other words, the Tier I classification by the Department of
Homeland Security for the city of Chicago is supported by the security zone averages
presented in Table 6.
To confirm the statistical significance of the averages in Table 6, a one-way
analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical test was conducted. ANOVA allows for
determining the statistical
_________________________________________________________________
Table 7. ANOVA Results of Security Zone Averages
_________________________________________________________________
Variance Source Sum of Squares
Between
0.5838
Groups
Within
0.3245
Groups
Total
0.9082

Degrees of Freedom

Mean Squares

2

0.2919

6

5.4078E-02

8

N/A

F-Value = 5.397
Critical F-Value = 4.46
significance of three or more sample means simultaneously (Vito and Latessa, 1989).
The null hypothesis for this test is that the mean is the same for all observed groups. The
alternate hypothesis is that the average is not the same for all groups. The FValue/Statistic for this sample is 5.397. The F-Value exceeds the minimum critical value
of 4.46 with two degrees of freedom at 0.05 significance; the null hypothesis is rejected.
With the null hypothesis rejected, these averages are statistically significant and at least
two groups averages are different from each other in this sample.
Detroit does have a higher surveillance average than the Tier I city of Chicago. A
feasible explanation to the higher surveillance scores are Detroit’s high crime rates.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2011 Uniform Crime Report, Detroit
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does have the highest per capita violent crime rate of the three cities studied. Project
Lighthouse was implemented to augment the Detroit Police Department in response to
Detroit’s crime rate. The majority of Detroit’s surveillance score was generative from
CCTV cameras. FEMA’s Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks
Against Buildings lists CCTV cameras as a cost effective measure for general crime
deterrence. Therefore, Detroit’s high surveillance scores may be in response to an overall
high violent and property crime rate which will be discussed later in this chapter.
The security zone building scores were also noticeably different from city to city.
Of the three security zone criteria, Chicago’s highest average ranked security zone
variable was for access restriction, whereas Indianapolis was behavior and Detroit’s was
surveillance. According to FEMA’s mitigation manual, the most expensive security
measure to combat urban terrorism is access restrictions. Chicago has received the most
funding from the Urban Areas Security Initiative therefore; Chicago is able to afford
more costly anti-terrorism measures like access restrictions. Surveillance appears to be
the chief concern of Downtown Detroit with its central business district neighborhood
watch program, Project Lighthouse, and the afore mentioned cost effectiveness of CCTV
cameras. Indianapolis, have the lowest funding and crime rates, appears to be using
effective behavioral security measures in its central business district.
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____________________________________________
Table 8. Average Security Zone Building Scores
Public vs. Private Buildings
(Tier I vs. Tier II)
____________________________________________
City

Average Public
Building Security
Score

Chicago
(Tier I)
Indianapolis
(Tier II)
Detroit
(Tier II)
Tier II
Means
Tier I vs. Tier II
Differences

Average Private
Building Security
Score

4.6

2.83

4.5

2.22

3.6

3.1

4.23

2.71

0.55

0.17

As table 8 indicates, publicly owned buildings, which are either managed by city,
county or federal officials, all had higher security zone building scores when compared to
privately owned buildings, regardless of Tier level. The higher building score leads to a
more intense security zone surrounding the building in question. While Chicago has the
overall highest security zone for public spaces, followed closely by Indianapolis, Detroit
did have the highest average building score for privately owned buildings, exceeding
Chicago’s score by 0.27. Private building owners in Detroit may be fortifying their
businesses in response to high crime rates.
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Table 9. Independent Group T-Test Analysis
Group
Observations
Mean
Standard Deviation
Average Public
3
4.233334
0.5507537
Building Security
Score
Average Private
3
2.1716666
0.4508144
Building Security
Score
T-Statistic = 3.690916
Degrees of Freedom = 4
Critical Value (One-Tail at 0.05) = 2.132
Critical Value (Two-Tail at 0.05) = 2.776
The result of a T-Test for statistically significant differences in mean building
security scores is presented in Table 9. The findings indicate that there is a statistically
significant mean difference in the average public building security scores and the average
of private building security scores. The T-Statistic of 3.690916 is larger than the
minimum critical value of 2.776. The null hypothesis is rejected and the alternative
hypothesis is accepted. It can be stated that public building security score averages are
higher than private building security scores sampled in this study. The difference in
means shows that public building security scores, on average, score 1.5 more points than
private buildings in this study. The chance that sampling error explains this difference in
the averages is less than 5 in 100 chances.
However, it is interesting to note that of all the city districts studied in this
analysis, approximately 25% of each area exhibited some form of security zone as seen in
Table 10. The central Loop in Chicago was found to have 22.6% of its area with some
type of security zone in place. Indianapolis and Detroit had 25.2% and 26.7%,
respectively. The average area of the three central business districts to employ some type
of security zone is 24.8%. These percentages were calculated from taking the total
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square feet of the sample area and subtracting the square feet of observed fortified space
and dividing the difference. These percentages are interesting when also comparing the
amount of federal dollars spent per each city.
____________________________________________
Table 10. Percentage of Security Zone Landscape
in Observed Sample Area
____________________________________________
City
Security Zone %
22.6
Chicago
(Tier I)
25.2
Indianapolis
(Tier II)
26.7
Detroit
(Tier II)
26.0
Tier II
Averages
-3.3
Tier I vs. Tier II
Differences
Chicago, a Tier I city on the Department of Homeland Security’s Urban Areas
Security Initiative, was awarded $477,545,542 from 2002 to 2012 to specifically combat
terrorist activities. The Tier II city of Detroit, secured $132,614,497, and had the highest
percentage of security zones. Indianapolis, also a Tier II city, secured the lowest amount
of federal funding of the three cities observed, at $50,774,706, which was the most
economical. The overall area studied in Indianapolis was slightly larger than the central
Loop, and 25.2% of Indianapolis’ central business district had a detectable security zone
compared to 22.6% for the central Loop.
Buildings housing government entities and financial institutions were the most
likely to have a security zone in the surrounding area. Office buildings, universities, and
businesses typically did not have security zones in their general vicinity. Security zones

147

of government entities, in all three cities, scored the highest for the security zone criteria.
The most common type of security zone criteria present for government entities are
surveillance and access restrictions.
Changes in Demographic, Economic, and Social Activities in Security Zones
In order to have a better understanding of demographic changes, as well as
changes in economic and social activity occurring within the Tier I and Tier II security
zones, population changes, crimes rates, and commercial office rental rates were
examined. All activity was examined over a ten year period, with a focus from pre-9/11
to present. Although it has been established security zones were present prior to
September 11th 2001, the terrorist attacks on that day amplified the presence of security
zones within U.S. cities (Coaffee, O’Hare and Hawkesworth, 2009). Therefore, this
paper focused on pre-9/11 to present day social and commercial activities occurring
within security zones.
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_________________________________________________________
Table 11. Population Changes
_________________________________________________________
2000
2010
Percent Change
City of Chicago
2,896,046
2,695,598
-6.9%
Population
Central Loop
893
2,044
+128.8%
(Chicago)
Population Rates
City of
781,870
820,445
+4.9%
Indianapolis
Population
Downtown
342
581
+69.8%
Indianapolis
Population Rates
City of Detroit
713,777
-24.9%
951,270
Population
Downtown
379
303
-20%
Detroit
Population Rates
(U.S. Census Data)
Population change within security zones was compared to the overall population
change of the city examined. Both Chicago’s and Indianapolis’ central business districts
have had an increase in population over the past ten years. The city of Chicago lost
200,418 residents from 2000 to 2010. However, Chicago’s central Loop experienced an
increase of 1,151 residents; up 128% from 2000 to 2010. The city of Indianapolis was
the only city in the study that had an overall increase in total population. Indianapolis
added 38,585 residents, an increase of 4.9%. Downtown Indianapolis experienced a
69.8% increase in residents from 2000 to 2010. The city of Detroit experienced an
overall loss of 237,493 residents for a 24.9% decrease in total population from 2000 to
2010. The central business district in Detroit had a smaller population decrease of 20%.
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While Detroit’s downtown population decline aligns with U.S. census data for the entire
city, Downtown Detroit did not experience as high as a population decline as the overall
city. Therefore, the population data suggest that the security zones of all three cities
experienced population changes that differed from the overall population patterns
between 2000 and 2010, and these changes tended to be population increases for the
areas inside security zones and decreases outside of the zones. This suggests that security
zones may have had a positive impact on the residential patterns within them. However,
further research must be conducted to exclude spurious relationships.
Social Activity
Morenoff, Sampson, and Roudenbush (2001) conducted a neighborhood level
study on homicide rates within the city of Chicago. They found that concentrated
disadvantage and low levels of social control within neighborhoods were accurate
predictors of homicide rates. However, they also noted that a neighborhoods’ spatial
proximity to homicide risk was also strongly associated with variations in homicide rates.
This study compared crimes rates within and outside of the previously established
security zones to further assess the affect of levels of social control on social activities.
Crime data consisted of crimes against persons and crimes against property. Crimes
against persons include: robbery, battery, assault, homicide, and criminal sexual assault.
Crimes against property are comprised of: theft, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
Crimes against persons and property from 2001 through 2011 were compared
within Chicago’s Loop. The city of Chicago Police Department did not start to collect
and archive specific spatial crime data until 2001. It was found that crimes against
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persons increased by 7.8% through the ten year period. Crime against property
experienced a larger decrease of 42.9%.
_________________________________________________________
Table 12. Central Loop and
Neighboring Community Areas Crime Rates
_________________________________________________________
2001
2011
Percent Change
Central Loop
114
123
+7.8
crimes against
person
Central Loop
2,586
1,475
-42.9
crimes against
property
Near West Side
487
237
-51.3%
crimes against
persons
Near West Side
1,952
1,644
-15.7%
crimes against
property
Near South Side
90
29
-67.7%
crimes against
persons
Near South Side
475
316
-33.4%
crimes against
property
Near North Side
367
237
-35.4%
crimes against
persons
Near North Side
3,109
1,989
-36%
crimes against
property
(City of Chicago Data Portal)

The Near West Side, which contains the University of Illinois-Chicago, United
Center, and several hospitals, is located directly west from the Loop. From 2001 to 2011,
the Near West Side saw a 51.3% decrease of crimes against persons. Crimes against
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property decreased a modest 15.7%. The Near South Side is located just south the Loop.
The Near South Side contains Soldier Field, McCormick Place, and the Museum
Campus. This community area saw a 67.7% decrease of crimes against persons, and a
33.4% decrease in crimes against property. The Near North Side, located just north of
the Loop, is home to Navy Pier, the Magnificent Mile, and the Gold Coast. Located just
north of the Loop, the Near North Side is considered to be an affluent community. This
area saw a 35.4% decrease in crimes against persons, and a 36% decrease of crimes
against property.
In 2011, the Bureau of Justice Statistics National Crime Victimization Survey
reported that between 2001 and 2010, the U.S. experienced an average decrease in crimes
against persons of 33.5 percent. When comparing all three neighboring community areas
to the Loop, there was a 51.4% decrease in crimes against persons from 2001 to 2011,
while the Loop saw a 7.8% increase in crimes against persons for the same time period.
The National Crime Victimization Survey also found from 2001 to 2010, there was a
19.2% decrease in the national average for crimes against property. The three
neighboring community areas had a 28.3% decrease in crimes against property, while the
Loop saw a 43% decrease in crimes against property. Therefore, the increase in crimes
against persons for the Chicago security zone is surprising in light of the strong contrary
trends in the surrounding areas and the large decrease for property crimes in the security
zone.
The next set of data examined was Downtown Indianapolis crimes rates from
2000 to 2010 and comparing the crime incidents to neighboring communities. The
downtown crime rates for Indianapolis showed an 18.2% increase in crimes against

152

persons from 2000-2010, and crimes against property decreased by 5.3% in downtown
Indianapolis.
The West Indianapolis neighborhood and Near Eastside neighborhood crime rates
were also examined to compare to the downtown crime rates. West Indianapolis, located
directly west of the central business district, has the highest concentration of industrial
parks within the city. West Indianapolis experienced a 35% increase in crimes against
persons and a 78% increase in crimes against property from 2000 to 2010. West
Indianapolis has a general reputation as a high crime neighborhood and has one of the
highest crime rates in the Indianapolis Metropolitan
_________________________________________________________
Table 13. Downtown Indianapolis and
Neighboring Community Areas Crime Rates
_________________________________________________________
2000
2010
Percent Change
Downtown
280
331
+18.2%
Indianapolis crimes
against persons
Downtown
1,812
1,715
+5.3%
Indianapolis crimes
against property
West Indianapolis
663
896
+35.1%
crimes against
persons
West Indianapolis
754
1,347
+78.6%
crimes against
property
Near Eastside
1,192
728
-38.9%
Indianapolis crimes
against persons
Near Eastside
2,238
2,912
+30.1%
Indianapolis crimes
against property
(Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Crime Analysis Section)
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Police Department area. The Near Eastside has been a target of numerous urban renewal
projects since the 1950s, and is more diverse than other neighborhoods in the
Indianapolis metro area. The neighborhood experienced a 38.9% decrease in crimes
against persons, which is consistent with national trends. However, the neighborhood
had a 30% increase in property crimes from 2000-2010. When comparing crime rates in
Downtown Indianapolis to the neighboring communities there are similarities as well as
differences. Both neighboring areas show increases in property crimes while Downtown
Indianapolis experienced a decrease, while for property crimes, Downtown Indianapolis
had an increase, and there were increase and decrease in east and west side
neighborhoods respectively.
Crime rates in the city of Detroit were examined next. Unfortunately, specific
spatial crime data for Detroit were not available. The only crime data available for the
year 2000 was the National Neighborhood Crime Study and only for census tract 5208,
which encompasses half of the sampled area. Therefore the comparison was only
conducted for that particular census tract. The city of Detroit had a 23.2% decrease in
crimes against persons and a 35% decrease in crimes against property from 2000 to 2010.
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_________________________________________________________
Table 14. Detroit Crime Rates (City of Detroit vs. Census Tract 5208)
_________________________________________________________
2000
2012
Percent Change
Crimes against
22,112
16,973
-23.2%
persons (Detroit)
Crimes against
73,649
47,809
-35%
property (Detroit)
Crimes against
247
429
+73.6%
persons (Census
Tract 5208)
Crimes against
2,783
2,328
-16.3%
property (Census
Tract 5208)
(Uniform Crime Report 2000 & 2010, ESRI Community Analyst &
National Neighborhood Crime Study)
However, in tract 5208, crimes against persons increased by 73.6% while crimes
against property had a 16.3% decrease. Detroit did have the highest surveillance average
of all examined cities. Detroit also had an active central business district neighborhood
watch program which encompasses the majority of Downtown Detroit.
Both Chicago and Detroit had high surveillance and access restriction scores and
when compared to the large decrease in crimes against property in both cities, it could be
argued that security zones exhibiting intense access restrictions and surveillance
measures have affected property crime rates.
When comparing Tier I downtown Chicago to Tier II Downtown Indianapolis, the
Loop had a 43% decrease in property crime compared to Indianapolis’ decrease of 5.3%.
In fact, the Chicago Loop exceeded the national average decrease in crimes against
property by 23.8%. Given the significantly higher behavioral, surveillance, and access
security zones scores in Chicago, it could be argued that property crime rates are affected
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by these security measures. On the other hand, Indianapolis had an 18.2% increase for
crimes against persons, while Chicago experienced a 7.8% increase for crimes against
persons, which suggests that security zones appear more effective in reducing property
crime compared to crimes against persons in both Tier 1 and II cities.
Economic Activity
In order to assess changes in economic activity in the Tier I and Tier II security
zones, Class A office space rental rates within the security zones were compared to those
of neighboring community areas. Class A office space is defined as desirable investment
grade properties and they command the highest rents or sale prices. Class A office
buildings also tend to be architectural or historical landmarks and the focus of potential
terrorist attacks.
_________________________________________________________
Table 15. Chicago Office Space Rental Rates (per square foot)
_________________________________________________________
2000
2012
Percent Change
Central Loop
$31.11
$28.53
-8.2%
Near West Side

$33.85

$30.43

-10.1%

Near South Side

$36.33

$27.75

-23.6%

Near North Side

$30.01

$28.82

-3.9%

(Costar Property, NAI Hiffman, Julien J. Studley Inc. Crain Communications, &
Cushman and Wakefield)
Chicago’s central loop experienced an 8.2% decrease in rental rates from 2000 to
2012. The Near West Side, Near South Side, and Near North side saw decreases of
10.1%, 25.2%, and 3.9% respectively. The average decrease in rental rates of all three
neighboring community areas was a 13%. Briggs (2005) argued that as security zones
increase within the urban core, there is a corresponding decentralization of businesses
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and agencies into outlying areas. Moreover, this phenomenon would lead to higher
vacancy rates and lower rental rates within the security zones in the central business
districts. However, with the exception of the near North Side, it appears rental rates have
declined less within the central business district of Chicago, where security zones are
focused, when compared to neighboring community areas. This also suggests that the
increased social control measures have affected the economic activity within the security
zones.
Turing to the Tier II cities, Downtown Indianapolis office rental space rates were
compared against suburban office rental space rates from 2000 to 2012. From 2000 to
2012, downtown Indianapolis saw a 3.9% increase in office space rental rates from 2000
_________________________________________________________
Table 16. Indianapolis Office Space Rental Rates (psf)
_________________________________________________________
2000
2012
Percent Change
Downtown
$17.58
$18.27
+3.9%
Indianapolis
Suburban
$17.90
$17.10
-4.4%
Indianapolis
(Indianapolis Downtown, Inc., CBRE Group & Cassidy and Turley Commercial Real
Estate Services)
through 2012. When looking at suburban Indianapolis office space rental rates from
2000 to 2010, there was a 4.4% decrease in rental rates.
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_________________________________________________________
Table 17. Downtown Detroit Office Space Rental Rates (per Square foot)
_________________________________________________________
2000
2012
Percent Change
$23.59
$22.63
-4%
(CBRE Group)
Downtown Detroit’s office space rental rates were obtained from 2000 to 2012.
Unfortunately, comparisons of surrounding areas for the year 2000 were not available.
Downtown Detroit’s office space rental rates have decreased by 4% from 2000 to 2012.
When comparing Chicago’s central business districts office rental rates to the Tier II rates
of Indianapolis and Detroit, the findings are mixed. Indianapolis rental rates increased,
while those of Chicago and Detroit decreased.
Given the crime prevention through environmental design and defensible space
aspects of security zones, it is interesting to note that where they are most concentrated,
they appear to be attracting residents and have stable commercial office space rental
rates. In fact, rental rates have increased in downtown Indianapolis, while suburban
office space rental rates have decreased. With the combination of Chicago and
Indianapolis’ central businesses districts attracting residents and commercial office rental
rates are increasing, especially in the case of Downtown Indianapolis, it appears that the
central businesses districts may be undergoing gentrification. In fact, the security zones
may be providing a sense of safety and security, therefore negating Boddy’s (2008)
architecture of dis-assurance argument and supporting the argument that security zones
are social mechanisms operating within behavior settings that can either restrict or
facilitate demographic, social, and economic activities.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Previous studies have illustrated anti-terror security present in major metropolitan
cities like New York (Marcuse, 2006), London (Coaffee, 2009), Washington D.C.
(Benton-Short, 2007) and Jerusalem (Savitch, 2008), however none have conveyed the
spatial extent of security zones as was done in this study. Nemeth (2010) and Hollander
and Whifield (2010) have identified the presence of security zones. However, they have
not provided the spatial extent and intensity of security zones on public space as was
done in this study. Nemeth (2010) and Hollander and Whifield (2010) did not use IDW
interpolation or Sampson’s ecometric methodology to study this phenomena. Nor did
they evaluate demographic, social, and economic activity occurring within and around
the sampled security zones. This dissertation contributes to empirical studies on security
zones within public urban space by examining urban fortification and the spatial extent
and intensity of security zones as well as their influence on public space. And although
the idea of using some form of spatial arrangements as tools for crime control has a long
established history, the presence of physical security zones within urban areas has
increased since the September 11th terrorist attacks (Marcuse, 2006; Coaffee, 2009).
When walking in a major U.S. city, it does not take long to notice blast-proof planters,
bollards, or reinforced street lamps, while being monitored by countless CCTV cameras.
To better understand the emerging phenomena of security zones and fortification
of urban public space, this dissertation analyzed security zones located in the central
business districts of Chicago, Detroit, and Indianapolis. This study was able to identify
the spatial extent and intensity of security zones located in the three cities. The intensity
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of which thee cities utilized the security zone variables of behavior, surveillance, and
access restrictions was also identified.
This analysis determined Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit, with substantially
smaller populations and density levels than larger global cities such as New York and
London, (both of have both experienced terrorist attacks), have fortified buildings, areas,
and neighborhoods as well as restricted public space in their civic and financial districts.
However, each city employed security zones in different forms. Chicago had many
smaller security zones, but focused more on access restrictions and target hardening.
Indianapolis had less security zones and employed cost effective behavioral controls.
Detroit focused heavily on surveillance measures and had a vast network of CCTV
cameras.
Moreover, buildings housing government entities and financial institutions were
the most likely to have a security zone in the surrounding area. Office buildings,
universities, and businesses typically did not have security zones in their general vicinity.
It was found that publicly owned buildings, on average, had a higher security zone score
when compared to privately owned buildings. More specifically, federal government
entities, in all three cities, scored the highest for the security zone criteria. The most
common type of security zone criteria present for government entities are surveillance
and access restrictions.
The most frequently observed behavioral variable throughout this study was
prohibitive signage. These signs mainly prohibited public loitering in certain areas of the
building. For surveillance the CCTV camera was the most observed. FEMA (2011)
recommends the use of CCTV cameras as a low case and moderately effective means to
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deter criminal activity. The bollard and crash rated planter were the most observed
access restriction. These defensive measures provide the greatest amount of protection to
the building and its inhabitants (FEMA, 2011).
Seventeen buildings in the central Loop exhibited a security zone. Detroit and
Chicago had fifteen and thirteen buildings, respectively. Detroit and Indianapolis both
had significant areas that did not have a security zone present. Chicago’s security surface
was more intense than the other cities. Adapting the observable security zone criteria and
imputing the data into ArcGIS and ArcScene, this study has been able to display a
phenomenon of public and private fortification of space that is present in Downtown
Detroit, Indianapolis’ central business district, and Chicago’s central Loop.
As previously noted, Sampson (2003) has posited that social mechanisms
operating within behavior settings can either restrict or facilitate demographic, social, and
economic activities. This dissertation has argued that security zones are in effect
empirical measures of Sampson’s concept of social mechanisms and that it is important
to determine to what extent security zones identified in the three cities of interest in this
study have affected the demographic, social and economic activities within them. The
impact of enhanced social control measures on the demographic, social and economic
activities of a Tier I (Chicago) and two Tier II cities (Indianapolis and Detroit) were
assessed by examining population, crime and office rental rate changes from
approximately 2000 to 2010.
When comparing the population, crime rates, and office space rental rates of the
sample areas several findings stood out. The first was the population of the sample areas.
Even though overt anti-terrorism security measures are present, within the central
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business districts of Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit, city dwellers are not deterred
from residing within an area which has a high potential for a future terrorist strike. The
city of Chicago had a total population loss of approximately 7%, yet the central Loop
experienced a 128% increase in population from 2000 to 2010. Indianapolis had a
population increase of about 5%; however Downtown Indianapolis experienced nearly a
70% increase of residents. Detroit had an overall population loss of 25%, but Downtown
Detroit only experienced a 20% loss. Boddy’s (2008) architecture of dis-assurance
argument is questioned with these findings.
It is also important to note that social activities evidenced significant changes
within the security zones of the three cities of interest in this study. Crimes against
property decrease in all three sample areas. Chicago’s Loop experienced nearly a 43%
reduction of property crimes from 2001 to 2011, and the reduction in property crime was
greater in the security zones than the surrounding communities in the Chicago
metropolitan area. Property crime rates also differed by areas of Indianapolis. When
examining the surrounding neighborhoods, property crimes increased dramatically, while
Downtown Indianapolis experienced a decrease in property crimes. Downtown Detroit
also experienced a decrease in crimes against property.
These findings suggest that the implementation of security zones may be a factor
in the reduction of property crimes. Access restrictions, in particular, may be more
effective in reducing property crimes as was observed in the city of Chicago with its
significant decrease. Security zones appear to be manipulating behavior settings by
imposing access restrictions, behavioral controls, and surveillance measures. This
finding lends support to Routine Activities theory in that target hardening and increased
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surveillance activities within these security zones may have had an effect on property
crimes. Crime prevention through environmental design and defensible space measures,
which are adapted into security zones, appear to be working to reduce property crimes in
the sampled urban areas. These findings also support an extension of Sampson’s (2003)
argument that social mechanisms such as security zones may influence social activities
occurring within them.
To better understand the effect of security zones on economic activities,
commercial office space rental rates in Chicago, Indianapolis, and Detroit were
compared. From 2000 to 2012, Chicago’s central Loop only had an 8.2% decrease in
rental rates. The average loss for the surrounding community areas was 12.5%.
Downtown Indianapolis had an increase in rental rates in the same time period, while
suburban Indianapolis had a 4.4% decrease of rental rates. Downtown Detroit had a 4%
decrease in rental rates, an again there was a lack of available data to compare this
finding. These downtown areas present a number of high value and high profile targets
for potential terrorists. However, the comparisons show these downtown business
districts are exhibiting population increases, a reduction in property crimes, and have a
lower decline in Class A commercial office space rental rates when compared to
surrounding neighborhoods. These findings again nullify Boddy’s architecture of disassurance argument.
Each district studied had no more than 27% of urban space secured,
demonstrating that the majority of urban space in these cities are still open and accessible
to the public with limited restrictions in place. While this research shows that
fortification is present, and has increased in response to terrorist threats around the world,
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these cities have not reacted by becoming militarized zones where every action is under
strict control. For the most part, individuals can still freely interact within public city
space.
This study responded to Sampson’s call to utilize ecometric research and the
integration of GPS and GIS techniques into sociological research, and in doing so has
identified the spatial extent and intensity of security zones in these three cities. However,
further research is needed to better understand the long term impact of security zones and
their effect on urban public and private space. With the installation of security measures
in urban public space, questions are raised about the association between security
measures and fear. More specifically, further research could be done to test Boddy’s
(2008) belief that anti-terrorism security measures are creating an aura of dis-assurance
within the city. Now that the extent and intensity of security zones have been
established, future researchers may want to examine if fear among city dwellers is
heightened when entering or residing within areas exhibiting security zones. Using the
research conducted in this study, the concept of fear could be examined by studying
reactions of people within mapped security zones. This will help identify if people feel
more or less safe with these visible security zones. This would be important data in
maintaining a thriving economy in these areas that can attract local residents and tourists
as well as maintain safety.
Researchers may also want to focus on the long term effects of security zones on
people residing or working within security zones. Graham (2007) argues that a culture of
fear is driving efforts to fortify U.S. cities and that the constant barrage of the 24/7 news
cycle only fuels citizens paranoia. Therefore, assessing the effect of media exposure on
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urban residents in these areas of high risk for terrorist attacks could be a possible addition
to future studies on behavioral settings such as security zones.
Future research should also include in depth interviews to better determine other
concerns that may be associated with security zones. Interviews with respondents might
reveal additional causal factors of security zones that are not currently addressed in
existing literature. A future study could assess which security methods are more or less
acceptable to people within urban areas of varying degrees of risk to terrorist attacks and
their proximity to security zones.
There are limitations of this study which must be noted. Future studies could
improve upon these findings by increasing the number of sampled cities. Eventually, a
database could be created for every city identified by the Department of Homeland
Security’s Urban Area Security Initiative List to be at risk for a potential terrorist attack.
This database could also be comprised of more measures of demographic, social, and
economic activities. Such measures could include: race, age, tourism and vacancy rates,
and a more specific breakdown of crime rates. By identifying more measures and
increasing the sample size, future research will be able to go beyond a descriptive
analysis of the security zones of these three cities to account for the variation in levels of
behavioral controls, access restrictions, and surveillance measures by within and between
cities.
However, this study provides a starting point for future researchers to better
quantify the existing phenomenon of security zones. This type of innovative
methodology, incorporating the latest technological advances can be used as a baseline
for longitudinal research for security zones existing within Chicago, Indianapolis, and
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Detroit. Future studies will be able to detect if security zones are becoming more or less
restrictive to surrounding urban space in these three cities, as well as other Tier I and Tier
II cities across the United States.
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